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This dissertation is comprised of three empirical essays on technological change.
The first chapter examines how industrial R&D intensities respond to environmen-
tal regulations when considering specific industry characteristics such as pollution
intensity and immobility. Specifically, I study the impact of environmental regula-
tions on R&D intensities in 21 manufacturing industries in 28 OECD countries from
2000-2007. I consider pollution intensity and the relative ease of relocation (im-
mobility) as industry characteristics that determine the optimal industry response
to increased environmental policy stringency. I find that more pollution intensive
industries innovate less as regulatory environments become more restrictive relative
to less pollution intensive industries. At the same time, more immobile industries
innovate more than more mobile industries as environmental regulations become
more stringent, illustrating innovation as an alternative to relocation. In the second
chapter, I investigate how energy prices and production, government investment
in R&D, and similarities in environmental regulations may influence international
collaboration on energy patents. I study the propensity to collaboratively inno-
vate by examining counts of renewable energy and alternative energy patents from
1994-2008 that have multiple inventors that are located in more than one country.
Using a gravity model framework, I demonstrate that technological similarity, com-
ii
mon languages, trade relationships, and similarity in environmental regulations are
important drivers of collaboration in these technologies. When examining collabo-
ration between advanced and developing countries, however, higher production of
natural gas in developing countries and stronger environmental regulations in ad-
vanced nations positively affects the probability of collaboration. The third chapter
explores the role of international financial openness on industrial R&D intensities.
International financial integration may provide an important channel of financing for
research and development (R&D) that ultimately enhances economic growth. This
chapter extends the analysis of Maskus et al. (2012) by examining the impact of
refined measures of international financial openness, capital controls, and financial
structure on R&D intensities in 22 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD countries
for the period 1990-2003. We interact these country-level financial measures with
industry characteristics, namely dependence on external financing and the amount
of tangible assets. Our findings indicate that multiple capital openness indices and
financial structure measures are important determinants of R&D intensity. These
refined measures indicate that the significance of FDI as an international financial
development measure is driven primarily by external FDI assets. This may indicate
that multinational firms are able to access funds from affiliate firms abroad, and use
such funds as an important source of financing R&D expenditures.
iii
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1Chapter 1
The impact of environmental policy stringency on
industrial R&D conditional on pollution intensity
and relocation costs
1.1 Introduction
The relationship between environmental regulations and industry behavior has re-
ceived recent attention within the field of environmental economics. A growing body
of literature indicates that stringent environmental regulations encourage industrial
innovation, as technological advancements lower the cost of pollution abatement
(Jaffe et al., 2002; Popp et al., 2010). This has important social implications since
innovation may help control environmental damage caused by climate change (Popp
et al., 2010). By contrast, research that focuses on trade and capital flows provides
evidence that dirty industries may relocate, rather than innovate, to countries with
less stringent environmental regulations, creating concentrations of polluted geo-
graphical areas known as “pollution havens” (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). Thus,
more stringent environmental regulations may increase or decrease innovative activ-
ities. This paper contributes by providing a closer examination of the characteristics
that may determine whether an industry innovates or relocates in response to envi-
ronmental regulations.
More specifically, I examine empirically how cross-country differences in envi-
ronmental regulations contribute to industrial research and development (R&D) as
a fraction of industry output for pollution intensive manufacturing industries. I
2employ the methodology introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998), which utilizes
interactions between industry characteristics and country-level measures to study
within-country differences among industries. Though widely used to examine fi-
nance, growth, and other macroeconomic outcomes, this methodology has not been
applied directly to the topic of induced innovation and environmental regulations.
I loosely follow the framework of Maskus et al. (2012), who modify the Rajan and
Zingales (1998) approach to study the effects of financial development on industrial
R&D intensity. I focus, however, on how environmental regulations interact with
specific industry characteristics to affect R&D intensities.
To quantify the strength of environmental regulations in each country, I utilize
an index of perceived environmental regulatory stringency by corporate executives
in 28 countries. This data, provided by the World Economic Forum, is available for
the years 2000 to 2007. I interact this measure with two industry characteristics that
may be important in determining the response to such regulations. The first industry
characteristic is a measure of pollution intensity, which proves useful for determining
if R&D intensity is higher in industries that are “dirtier” within countries that have
stronger environmental regulations. The idea, first introduced by Hicks (1932),
that increases in relative factor prices can induce cost-saving technological change
provides further justification for the inclusion of a pollution intensity measure. Since
environmental regulations make polluting inputs more expensive, the innovative
response of industries is likely to vary based on their comparative usage of these
inputs.
The second industry characteristic is a measure of industry immobility as used
by Ederington et al. (2005) to capture how variation in relocation costs may affect
innovation. Though much of the early work concerning pollution havens indicates
a relatively small effect of environmental regulations on industry competitiveness
(Jaffe et al., 1995), Ederington et al. (2005) provide evidence that immobile indus-
3tries are less sensitive to environmental costs when it comes to relocating production,
masking the true effects of environmental regulations on international trade. To ex-
plore this potential, I utilize the ratio of fixed plant costs (structures) to the value
of total shipments for each industry. The intuition is that industries that devote a
higher percentage to structures will be less likely to move production when faced
with tougher environmental regulations because it is costly to do so.
The main results of this paper can be summarized by the following. I find that
industries that are more pollution intensive innovate less under more stringent regu-
lations relative to less pollution intensive industries. This result, however, is partially
contingent upon the the relative ease of relocation. I find that industries that are
less “footloose” innovate relatively more as environmental regulations increase in
stringency. The immobility channel has a larger effect on R&D intensity than the
pollution intensity interaction. Quantitatively speaking, the R&D intensity of an
industry that is very immobile in a country with strong environmental regulations is
3.77 to 4.93 percentage points higher than that of an industry that is less immobile
in a country that has weaker environmental regulations. When compared to the
average R&D intensity of 1.65%, this result looks quite large. At the same time,
the direct effect of environmental regulations is found to have a negative impact on
R&D intensities, illustrating the possibility that regulations impose costs that shift
funds away from innovative activities.
Prior research that investigates the notion of induced innovation and environ-
mental policy motivates this study. A series of case studies examined by Porter
and van der Linde (1995) provide anectodal evidence that environmental policy in-
duced innovation can simultaneously mitigate the increased costs of regulation while
improving efficiency and productivity. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) empirically investi-
gate this claim by analyzing the relationship between pollution abatement expenses
and two innovative measures, R&D expenditures and patenting, for a panel of U.S.
4industries from 1974 to 1991. Abatement expenses are used as an industry level
proxy for the strength of environmental regulations. While they find that there is a
significant positive relationship between abatement expenditures and R&D expen-
ditures once industry specific effects are controlled for, they find little evidence for
a significant relationship between abatement expenditures and general patenting.
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) look specifically at
environmentally related technology by utilizing international patent classifications.
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) document a positive relationship between abatement
costs and environmental patenting for Japan, Germany, United States, and 14 low
and middle-income countries. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find a relatively small
effect, illustrating that environmentally related patents increase by 0.04% when pol-
lution abatement expenditures increase by $1 million. Recent work by Johnstone
et al. (2012) indicates that greater policy stringency has a positive effect on envi-
ronmental patenting in a panel of 77 countries across seven years, using the same
environmental policy stringency index that is used in this paper. They find that
a one unit increase in environmental regulations induces a 6% to 19% increase in
high-value environmental patents.
This paper also relates to recent literature regarding pollution havens and indus-
trial location decisions. Kellenberg (2009) finds robust confirmation of a pollution-
haven effect once the endogenous determination of environmental, trade, and intel-
lectual property rights policies are controlled for. He also finds further evidence that
more mobile industries are likely to be affected more significantly by environmental
regulations when it comes to relocation. Wagner and Timmins (2009) control for
FDI agglomeration externalities and find evidence of pollution-haven effects in the
German chemical industry. Thus, there is empirical evidence that environmental
policy may induce both innovation and relocation. While much of the literature
analyzes these effects as separate topics, I contribute by studying them jointly.
5The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the method-
ology while section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 illustrates the results, with
sensitivity analysis in section 5. Concluding remarks and policy implications are
presented in section 6.
1.2 Methodology
In this paper I examine the effect of environmental regulations on R&D intensity,
measured by R&D expenditures as a fraction of industry output, in industries that
are ranked by (i) emissions of different types of air pollutants (ii) their ability to re-
locate (immobility). The first industry characteristic, pollution intensity, describes
the relative cost of compliance with environmental regulations. I assume that in-
dustries that are more pollution intensive will have higher abatement costs, based
on prior empirical findings. For example, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) report a
statistically significant correlation of 0.80 between pollution emission intensities,
measured by total toxic releases, and pollution abatement costs among four-digit
ISIC sectors in the United States. Cole and Elliott (2005) report that pollution
abatement operating costs are highest for the petroleum, primary metals, paper,
and chemical industries in the U.S., four of the most pollution intensive industries
in my sample. The second industry characteristic, immobility, measures the ease of
relocating production to a foreign country. The assumption, based on the work by
Ederington et al. (2005), is that industries with higher fixed plant costs (structures)
will be less likely to move production because it is costly to do so. In other words,
a larger investment in structures discourages an industry from relocating because it
would require a significant investment, the construction of a new plant, in the new
country (Ederington et al., 2005).
I interact these two industry characteristics with environmental policy stringency,
measured at the country level, to study their impact on R&D intensity. My study
6builds on work by Jaffe and Palmer (1997), who focus on the impact of pollution
abatement expenditures on R&D expenditures for U.S. industries. By contrast, I
examine variation in regulation across countries. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) indicate
the challenges of specifying a theoretically sound structural or reduced form indus-
try level R&D equation due to difficulties in measuring exogenous determinants of
demand and supply, as well as the lack of data related to the real costs of scientists
or research equipment. As a consequence they present a very simple reduced form
specification, with logged R&D expenditures as the dependent variable, and logged
pollution abatement expenditures as the independent variable of interest. Along
similar lines I investigate the broad statistical relationship between environmental
regulations and innovation, where I further condition this relationship on industry
characteristics using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach.
The empirical approach used in this paper is similar to that in Maskus et al.
(2012) who regress R&D intensities on interactions of industry characteristics with
country-level measures of national and international financial development. The in-
clusion of interaction terms, developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), allows for the
utilization of cross-country variation to examine within-country differences across
industries. In this context, it is advantageous for determining if R&D intensity re-
sponds more for different types of industries as country-level factors change over
time. The country-level variable of interest in this study is the strength of environ-
mental regulations, denoted as stringency below. The interactions deliver predic-
tions about whether industries that are more pollution intensive or more immobile
innovate more or less than less pollution intensive or more mobile industries in
7response to different regulatory environments. The estimating equation is given by:
R&D intensityj,k,t =β0 + β1(pollution intensityk x stringencyj,t)
+ β2(immobilityk x stringencyj,t) + β3(industry sharej,k,t)
+ β4(stringencyj,t) + ηj + ηk + ηt + j,k,t
(1.1)
where j indicates countries, k denotes industries, and t represents time. The in-
dicators ηk, ηj, and ηt control for unobserved industry, country, and time-specific
effects. R&D intensity is measured as total industry R&D expenditures relative to
industry output, across countries and time. Intensities are used in order to con-
trol for the relative importance of R&D across industries and to accommodate the
cross-country panel dataset. In general, the comparison of R&D expenditures across
countries is problematic due to the lack of R&D specific exchange rates (Nat, 2014).
The use of R&D intensities, which avoids the issue of currency conversion, is a com-
mon approach in the comparison of international R&D statistics. Stringency is a
country measure of perceived environmental regulation from the World Economic
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey. I include the industry share in GDP to control
for different industry patterns across countries and expect β3 to be negative, as in
Maskus et al. (2012), with lower R&D intensities in larger industries. The direct
effect of environmental stringency is included in the regression as it varies across
both countries and time. The direct effects of pollution intensity and immobility
are captured within ηk and are not included as separate variables since they are
calculated using U.S. data and do not vary across countries or time. The two indus-
try characteristics, pollution intensity and immobility, are each are interacted with
environmental regulatory stringency.
Theoretical work by Ulph (1997) provides a foundation for predictions about the
effect of environmental policy stringency on innovation. He shows that an increase
8in emission taxes raises the marginal benefit from environmental innovation and
thus encourages firms to invest in R&D. He also illustrates an indirect effect, where
emission taxes raise costs of production, reducing output and the incentive to un-
dertake R&D. Coupled with the aforementioned assumptions, I form the following
hypotheses to explain how industry characteristics may influence these two opposing
effects.
First, industries that are relatively more pollution intensive will have lower R&D
intensities than relatively less pollution intensive industries when environmental reg-
ulations increase in stringency because they have higher abatement costs. Thus,
“dirtier” industries will be more sensitive to environmental regulations due to the
increase in costs described by Ulph (1997). Thus, the coefficient on the interaction
of environmental policy stringency and pollution intensity, β1, is expected to be neg-
ative. Second, industries that are more immobile will have higher R&D intensities
than more mobile industries when environmental regulations become more restric-
tive because it is costly to relocate. In other words, the increase in the marginal
benefit from environmental innovation described by Ulph (1997) is a more likely
outcome for immobile industries. This leads to the prediction that the coefficient
on interaction between immobility and environmental policy stringency, β2, will be
positive. The direct effect of environmental policy stringency, β4, could be positive
or negative. Jaffe and Palmer (1997), find a positive effect of pollution abatement
expenditures on R&D innovation. Ulph, on the other hand, shows that increased
emission taxes could increase or decrease innovation. These hypotheses are restated
and tested in section 4.
I use U.S. data to measure the underlying industry characteristics considered
in this study, namely pollution intensity and immobility. Although many OECD
countries have started to record pollution emissions at the industry level through
Pollution Release and Transfer Registries (PRTRs), the availability of this data is
9limited for the time period considered and is not directly comparable across coun-
tries. Significant heterogeneity exists in the types of pollutants reported, industries
that are subject to reporting, methods of emission measurement, and reporting
thresholds. Data on the specific type of capital used to measure immobility is cur-
rently unavailable across nations.
These limitations motivate the use of U.S. data, which provides an adequate
proxy for these underlying intensity characteristics across countries. Pollution in-
tensity and immobility are characteristics that represent inherent technological dif-
ferences across industries that can be used to create a ranking, which is not likely to
differ across countries or over time.1 For example, the U.S. pollution intensity esti-
mates used in this paper are similar in ranking with Cole et al. (2005), who present
average pollution intensity data for U.K. manufacturing industries from 1990 to
2000. Basic metals, described by Jaffe et al. (1995) as a high abatement cost indus-
try in 1991, is still one of the most pollution intensive industries in the sample year
of 2002, indicating time invariance. According to Copeland and Taylor (2004), the
pollution intensity of the dirtiest manufacturing industries does appear relatively
stable across countries and pollutants and this fact has been commonly employed in
prior empirical work.2 Rankings based on immobility, which is also assumed to be
an inherent industry characteristic, are not likely to differ in a sample that contains
only OECD countries that are technologically similar. Using similar reasoning to
Rajan and Zingales (1998), I argue that the United States has well-developed en-
vironmental regulations and therefore the ranking of industries based on pollution
intensity and immobility are those that would exist in equilibrium. It is important
to emphasize that it is the ranking of industries based on these two characteris-
tics, rather than the actual levels of pollution emissions or structure related capital
1This is similar to the use of U.S. industry characteristics in Maskus et al. (2012) and Rajan
and Zingales (1998).
2For example, Mani and Wheeler (1998), Hettige et al. (1992), and Eskeland and Harrison
(2003) use U.S. pollution intensities to rank or classify industries in cross-country analyses.
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stocks, that is critical for interpreting the results of this paper.
Since pollution intensity and immobility are calculated using U.S. data and do
not vary over time, my analysis faces a limitation when considering the dynam-
ics of industry characteristics. I cannot, for example, study how these variables
change over time in response to policy changes. It is not unreasonable to consider
that industrial R&D may partially determine industry specific characteristics. For
example, Cole et al. (2005) argue that innovative activities reduce an industry’s
demand for pollution, and thus reduce the pollution intensity of its production pro-
cesses. Since pollution intensity and immobility are calculated using U.S. data and
do not vary across countries or over time, it is not likely that reverse causality will
be a problem. Furthermore, investment in R&D is not likely to cause the ranking
of industries over time to change. For example, if investment in R&D allows the
basic metals industry to employ cleaner production processes, it is still unlikely that
this industry will become less pollution intensive than the relatively clean food and
beverage production. As in Maskus et al. (2012), I remove the U.S. from the re-
gression analysis to avoid any feedback effects that may result from including U.S.
R&D intensities.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Research and development
I examine 21 manufacturing industries, shown in Table 1.1, at the two-digit ISIC
level in 28 OECD countries over a period of 8 years from 2000 to 2007. Data on
R&D intensities come from the OECD’s STAN Database and are calculated as total
industry R&D expenditures as a fraction of industry production in each country.
Industry shares are calculated as industry production divided by GDP.
11
There is an important caveat that applies when considering R&D as an innova-
tive measure in this context. Similar to Jaffe and Palmer (1997), I cannot distin-
guish between general R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures used for pollution
control or environmental technology. This is due, in part, to the limited availabil-
ity of environmental R&D data. One exception to this limitation is Magnani and
Tubb (2012) who study facility-level green R&D in a cross-section of seven OECD
countries. Through an analysis of survey data from over 4,000 facilities, they find
evidence that R&D at the industry level encourages firm level environmental R&D
through spillover effects.
Alternative measures of innovation, namely patent counts, are often utilized be-
cause of their disaggregated nature. Patents not only provide specific information
about the identities of the inventor and applicant, but also include a detailed descrip-
tion of the invention (Popp, 2005). This would be advantageous here, as technologies
related to environmental processes and pollution control could be clearly identified.
In industry specific studies, however, patent data can be problematic as the indus-
try code is not recorded by patenting offices (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). It is likely
that many environmentally related patents would be misclassified to industries that
produce environmental products rather than industries that produce metal, paper,
or chemicals but invest in pollution control innovation (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997;
Johnstone et al., 2012). For this reason, many studies that utilize patent counts
aggregate the data by patent classification rather than by industry. For example,
Johnstone et al. (2012) examine the impact of environmental regulations on specific
types of environmentally related technology selected based on International Patent
Classification (IPC) classes. Although concordance tables exist that attempt to link
patent descriptions to industry classifications, using patent data in industry specific
studies introduces imprecision. As a consequence, here, I rely on R&D intensities as
my dependent variable. Research by Popp and Newell (2012) indicates that pollu-
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tion control R&D may even occur at the expense of other R&D projects, creating a
“crowding-out effect.” I do not attempt to separate these effects, however, but refer-
ence the importance of total R&D in the broader literature, as a specific channel by
which environmental policies affect sustainable development, to provide motivation
for this type of broad sectoral study (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Aghion and Howitt,
1998).
1.3.2 Industry characteristics
Pollution intensities are drawn from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
2002 National Emissions Inventory.3 Emissions are measured in tons per year, and
have been aggregated from facility level observations.4 To create a measure of pol-
lution intensity, total aggregate emissions for each pollutant in each industry, are
expressed as a fraction of production, using U.S. data from the OECD. Several dif-
ferent byproducts of industrial fuel combustion are considered, including: carbon
monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOX), and particulate matter
(PM).5 Volatile organic compounds (VOC), pollutants that react with sunlight to
create ozone, is also included for comparison (United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and Standards, 2012). Table 3.5 presents the correlations of U.S.
industrial pollution intensities across industries for 2002. In general, some pollutant
intensities have strong positive correlations. For example, NOX and SO2 emissions
have a strong positive association. A similar positive correlation exists for CO and
PM. On the other hand, correlations between VOC intensities and other pollutants
are considerably smaller. This is likely due to differences in production processes
3The EPA’s National Emissions Inventory (NEI) data is available for 2002, 2005, and 2008.
The 2002 inventory is selected because it is closest to the beginning of the data coverage period of
2000 to 2007. Using the 2005 or 2008 NEI data provides similar results.
4Industries are converted from U.S. SIC 1987 to two-digit ISIC using Jon Haveman’s industry
concordances (2012).
5Includes PM2.5 and PM10. See United States Environmental Protection Agency and Standards
(2012) for more information.
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and may suggest varying responses to environmental regulations, motivating the
examination of these different measures. I also form a measure of total pollution
intensity as a comparative summary measure.
The measure of industry-level immobility, also used by Ederington et al. (2005),
is taken from the Bartelsman and Gray (1996) NBER-CES Manufacturing Indus-
try Database. To maintain consistency with the pollution intensity measure, U.S.
industry immobility is calculated in the year 2002 as the ratio of real structures cap-
ital stock to the total value of shipments. An immobility ratio of 15%, for example,
indicates that 15% of the value of that industry’s shipments is related to capital
that is costly to relocate. Thus, industries with higher ratios of fixed plant costs
to shipments are considered more immobile by this measure. Table 1.1 presents
the industry characteristics ranked by the immobility measure. The average R&D
intensity across countries and time for each industry is also included for compar-
ison. It should be noted that there is no clear association between average R&D
intensity, immobility, or pollution intensity. Different industries with high or low
average R&D intensities can be pollution intensive, immobile, or have differing rank-
ings regarding each characteristic. No clear relationship can be inferred regarding
average R&D intensity, though immobility seems to have a positive association and
pollution intensity a negative association. In addition, significant variations exist
across industries in terms of pollution intensity. Basic metals, for example, has much
higher pollution intensities than all other industries. Generally speaking, Table 3.5
illustrates that there is a weak association between pollution intensity and immobil-
ity, indicating more pollution intensive industries may be more immobile. However,
the correlations are small overall. It is likely that both of these characteristics,
immobility and pollution intensity, are important determinants of the optimal in-
dustry response to environmental regulation and indicate the complicated interplay
between R&D decisions, location decisions, and environmental regulations.
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1.3.3 Environmental policy stringency
Environmental policy, as the primary country-level variable, is notoriously difficult
to measure. By nature, environmental regulations are multidimensional, varying
across pollutants, industries, and countries, and with differing levels of enforcement
(Brunel and Levinson, 2013). In most cases, policies are not easily comparable
or quantifiable. Because of this difficulty, many papers have a very narrow focus.
For example, Popp (2002) examines the effect of energy prices on energy efficient
patents within the U.S. Popp (2006) looks specifically at the influence of NOX and
SO2 regulations on mitigation technology related to these two pollutants.
This paper measures a broader effect by using data from the World Economic
Forum’s (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey published in the annual Global Compet-
itiveness Report for the years 2000-2007. This measure is now widely employed in
both the environmental regulation and innovation and pollution haven literature.6
The specific survey question of interest asks executives the following: How stringent
is your country’s environmental regulation? (1 = lax compared to most countries,
7 = among the world’s most stringent). In my sample, the index ranges from 3.5 to
6.8. Though the WEF has conducted the Executive Opinion Survey for more than
30 years, this specific question regarding environmental policy became available in
the year 2000 and was included until 2007, limiting the sample time period.
While this survey variable faces a limitation in that it does not contain informa-
tion about pollutant-specific regulations, it has distinct advantages. First, Kellen-
berg (2009) points out that survey administration and data collection is conducted
with rigor. For example, the WEF partners with economics departments, research
institutes, and businesses to assist in a standardized delivery of the survey at a
national level. Once collected, the data are subject to a detailed editing process
including measures to ensure representativeness across sectors given the composi-
6Examples include the previously mentioned works by Kellenberg (2009), Wagner and Timmins
(2009), and Johnstone et al. (2012).
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tion of each country’s economy.7 Second, this variable measures the perception of
business executives facing environmental constraints in a very broad sense. This is
useful because it allows for the study of how perceptions of regulatory stringency
affect economic outcomes. Thus, it avoids the issue of considering separately the
imposition of regulations versus the enforcement of regulations. Executives that
believe that regulations are stringent may be more likely to respond by investing in
R&D that is aimed at abatement or cleaner production.
By contrast, much of the previous work on environmental regulations relies on
the U.S. Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) survey data as a
proxy for environmental stringency. Although this measure provides a clear look at
costs of compliance at the industry level in the U.S., no equivalent measure exists
in a cross-country setting. This limits analysis to the United States and a few other
developed nations who have conducted similar surveys. Furthermore, PACE itself
is subject to wider criticisms. Jaffe et al. (1995) explain the difficulty of estimating
capital and operating expenditures that would have occurred in absence of environ-
mental policies. Since firms engage in pollution control for other reasons such as
public relations, it is difficult to establish an appropriate baseline for comparison.
Johnstone et al. (2012) compare the PACE and WEF measures directly and find
a negative correlation between the two. They conclude that PACE data is not a
reliable measure of environmental policy stringency. Thus, I use the WEF data
to quantify the effect of environmental regulations on R&D intensities. Table 1.3
illustrates the variation in environmental regulations across countries by providing
the mean value over time of the WEF index for each country in the sample, ranked
from most to least stringent. I further explore the accuracy of the WEF measure
in section 5.2, and find that it is comparable to other measures of environmental
performance and regulation proxies.
7See the WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 for more information on survey im-
plementation, data collection, and aggregation techniques.
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Table 1.3: Average perceived stringency of environmental regulations over 2000-
2007.
Country Mean Country Mean
Germany 6.638 Czech Republic 5.063
Austria 6.413 Slovenia 4.971
Finland 6.338 Ireland 4.963
Switzerland 6.338 Italy 4.938
Netherlands 6.325 Portugal 4.825
Norway 6.150 Slovak Republic 4.763
Luxembourg 6.067 Hungary 4.738
Belgium 5.988 Estonia 4.729
New Zealand 5.963 Spain 4.700
Canada 5.788 Israel 4.575
United Kingdom 5.763 Korea 4.513
Japan 5.750 Poland 3.963
France 5.700 Greece 3.963
Iceland 5.663 Mexico 3.775
United States 5.625
1 = lax compared to most countries, 7 = among the world’s most stringent.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Benchmark using R&D intensity
Table 2.1 presents the baseline regression of R&D intensity on perceived environmen-
tal regulatory stringency interacted with pollution intensity and immobility. The
estimator used is OLS, with country, industry, and time fixed effects. The perceived
environmental policy stringency variable is interacted with each industrial pollution
intensity measure, total pollution intensity and with the immobility measure. A
baseline regression without interactions is included for comparison.
I test two specific hypotheses: (i) R&D intensity should be lower for relatively
more pollution intensive industries when environmental regulations increase in strin-
gency compared to less pollution intensive industries (β1 < 0) (ii) R&D intensity
should be higher for industries that are relatively more immobile when domestic
environmental regulations increase in stringency compared to relatively more mo-
bile industries (β2 > 0). I also examine whether the direct effect of environmental
regulations has a positive or negative effect on R&D intensities (β4 ≶ 0). Overall, I
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find that pollution intensive industries that are constrained by high costs of reloca-
tion innovate as a substitutable response to increases in environmental regulatory
stringency.
The coefficients on the pollution intensity interaction terms, β1, are negative
and statistically significant across all pollutants. This indicates that relatively more
pollution intensive industries innovate less under stricter environmental regulations
than do relatively less pollution intensive industries. Broadly speaking, this pro-
vides some suggestive evidence for a pollution-haven effect, as dirtier industries may
choose to relocate instead of innovate in response to stronger environmental regu-
lations. The coefficients on the immobility interaction terms, β2, are positive and
statistically significant. This suggests that relatively immobile industries innovate
more under stricter environmental regulations than relatively more mobile indus-
tries. The magnitudes of these coefficients are relatively similar across pollutants
with the exception of volatile organic compounds, which has larger intensities across
all industries. This is not surprising, as “dirtier” industries are generally pollution
intensive in all pollutants, as inferred in Tables 1.1 and 3.5. As expected, the coef-
ficient on the industry share in GDP is negative and statistically significant.8
Interpreting the coefficients on the interaction terms in Table 2.1 is challenging
because the stringency measure is ordinal rather than cardinal. It is, however, infor-
mative to consider a thought experiment used by both Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and Maskus et al. (2012) to provide some insight about the economic magnitude of
the coefficients. I determine how much the R&D intensity of the industry at the
75th percentile of pollution intensity exceeds the R&D intensity of the industry at
the 25th percentile of pollution intensity if both were moved from a low stringency
country (25th percentile; Estonia), to a high stringency country (75th percentile;
Belgium), while holding immobility at its mean. The same thought experiment is
also applied to the immobility measure. I consider how much the the R&D intensity
8Many of the country, industry, and time dummies are also jointly significant.
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of the industry at the 75th percentile of immobility exceeds the R&D intensity of
the industry at the 25th percentile of immobility if both were moved from a low
stringency country (25th percentile) to a high stringency country (75th percentile),
holding industry pollution intensity at its mean. Table 1.5 summarizes the magni-
tude of the estimates in percentage points for each type of pollutant.
Table 1.5: Magnitudes of estimates
Differential in R&D Intensity
CO Intensity -0.670
Immobility 4.926
PM Intensity -0.360
Immobility 4.275
NOX Intensity -0.445
Immobility 4.234
SO2 Intensity -0.417
Immobility 4.641
VOC Intensity -1.994
Immobility 3.766
Total Pollution Intensity -1.388
Immobility 4.682
Differential in R&D intensity is calculated as the percentage difference between an
industry at the 75th percentile of pollution intensity in a high-stringency country
(75th percentile) and an industry at the 25th percentile of pollution intensity in a
low-stringency country (25th percentile), holding immobility at its mean. The same
method is used for immobility, holding each specific industry pollutant at its mean.
The implied percentage point change in R&D intensity varies from -0.36 to -1.99
for pollution intensity. When compared to the average R&D intensity of 1.66%, this
effect can be quite large. More interestingly, immobility has a much larger effect
than pollution intensity for all pollutants. An increase in environmental policy
stringency from the 25th percentile country to the 75th percentile country increases
R&D intensity by 3.77 to 4.93 percentage points when comparing an industry at the
25th percentile of immobility to one at the 75th percentile. It is important to note,
however, that the direct effect of environmental policy stringency on industrial R&D
22
intensity, β4, is negative and highly significant. This may indicate that even though
an increase in innovation can occur indirectly through the immobility channel, it is
uncertain whether or not it can outweigh the direct effect of environmental policy
stringency.
The coefficient on β4 suggests that stronger environmental regulations may im-
pose direct costs that shift funds away from R&D. Though supported by the theo-
retical findings of Ulph (1997), this result differs from the empirical result of Jaffe
and Palmer (1997), who find a positive impact of environmental regulations on
lagged R&D expenditures. Their study, however, looks only at U.S data and uses
abatement expenses as a proxy for environmental regulations. Further support for a
negative coefficient comes from Robinson (1995), who finds empirical evidence that
EPA regulations redirect resources away from productivity-enhancing innovation. It
is interesting to note that the coefficient of environmental policy stringency is not
significant when no interaction terms are included.
1.4.2 R&D expenditures
One alternative way to measure R&D is to use logged R&D expenditures directly
rather than intensities. As a robustness check, to further investigate the significant
negative coefficient on environmental policy stringency, β4, I use logged R&D ex-
penditures as the dependent variable. Since the use of R&D expenditures in place
of R&D intensities requires the conversion to a common currency, I utilize the Penn
World Table’s PPP adjusted exchanges rate to express all values in U.S. dollars.
I consider a specification that is similar to the setup of Jaffe and Palmer (1997),
and include industry value added as a size control, in place of the industry share
of GDP. In addition, I include government R&D, which has a significant impact in
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) using U.S. data. I include two columns in Table 1.6, one
without interaction terms and one with the two interaction terms, so that the effect
23
Table 1.6: Log R&D expenditures as the dependent variable
No Interactions With Interactions
Log Value Added 0.748*** 0.763***
(0.0293) (0.0354)
Log Government R&D -0.150 -0.144
(0.142) (0.156)
Log Total Pollution Intensity*Log Stringency -0.154*
(0.0849)
Log Immobility*Log Stringency 1.768***
(0.512)
Log Stringency 0.723* -3.063**
(0.434) (1.346)
Constant -2.104* -1.626
(1.108) (1.285)
Country, industry, and time-dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3,300 3,109
Adjusted R-squared 0.879 0.878
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms
All variables converted to U.S. dollars using PPP adjusted exchange rates
of environmental policy stringency can be isolated.
Without the interactions terms, the impact of environmental policy stringency
on industrial R&D expenditures in Table 1.6 is positive and statistically signifi-
cant, consistent with the coefficient on abatement expenditures in Jaffe and Palmer
(1997). With the interaction terms, however, environmental policy stringency has a
significant negative impact, just as it does in Table 2.1. This provides support for
the idea that the addition of interaction terms may represent an important omission
from prior work. Importantly, the sign and significance of the interaction terms us-
ing either R&D intensity or R&D expenditures remain the same, indicating that the
interaction of industry characteristics is important. Government R&D is not signif-
icant in Table 1.6, presumably because it is captured by the country fixed effects.
Value added has a positive impact on R&D expenditures, consistent with Jaffe and
24
Palmer (1997).9
The results utilizing R&D expenditures as the dependent variable may avoid
issues related to the “output” component of R&D intensity. For example, it could
be the case that if relocation follows an increase in the strength of environmental
regulations, output would decline as firms exit the market, leading to an undeter-
mined effect on R&D intensity. It could also be the case that richer economies have
a higher demand for environmental regulations, and thus environmental policy strin-
gency could have a negative association with the ratio of R&D to output.10 Using
R&D expenditures avoids these issues and provides an additional link to the theo-
retical underpinnings in Ulph (1997), which refers to total R&D expenditures. I do
not utilize R&D expenditures in the main analysis presented in Table 2.1, however,
because R&D expenditures may not be as comparable as R&D intensities across
countries.11
1.5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I consider the robustness of these results. Specifically, I address
concerns over lagged values, omitted variables, and the nature of the environmental
stringency measure used in this study.
1.5.1 Additional specifications
There may be concern that changes in environmental policy may not have an im-
mediate effect on innovation. To verify this, I regress R&D intensity on industry
characteristics interacted with one and two period lagged values of environmental
9Performing this analysis using each individual pollutant provides very similar results to those
presented in Table 2.1.
10I thank two anonymous referees for pointing out this important point.
11Utilizing PPPs for R&D comparisons have shortcomings. For example, income and structural
differences can lead to PPPs derived from very different baskets of goods and services (Nat, 2014).
Using either PPP adjusted, or market exchange rates, may not fully represent comparable costs of
R&D across countries.
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policy stringency. Table 1.7 presents the results showing only total pollution inten-
sity, as the results are comparable for specific pollution intensities. Though these
results are still very similar, in terms of sign, significance, and magnitudes of the
coefficients of interest to the results in Table 2.1, the one difference is that the di-
rect effect of stringency is no longer statistically significant. In other words, the
direct negative impact of environmental policy stringency appears to be instanta-
neous, rather than lagged. One caveat is that there is not a lot of time variation
in the environmental policy variable due to the fact that the sample period is very
short. Thus, the lack of significance on the lagged stringency variable may only be
suggestive.12
There are several reasons why environmental policies differ across countries. As
countries reach a certain threshold level of development, environmental regulations
become more important as the demand for environmental quality increases. The
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) literature provides evidence of this link, in-
dicating an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and GDP per capita
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Variations in institutional quality may also play a
direct role in the creation and enforcement of environmental policy. Other factors
such as education and financial development may contribute not only to the strin-
gency of environmental regulations in a given country, but may also be drivers of
industrial R&D. Thus, these factors may represent omitted variables. Because envi-
ronmental policy is influenced by factors that may also be determinants of industrial
R&D intensity, these time-varying controls are added to the baseline specification.
Unobserved, time-invariant characteristics such as culture, for example, are still
captured by ηj.
Table 1.8 illustrates the baseline regression with added controls. Real GDP per
12To account for R&D intensity observations that are left censored at zero, I estimated a series
of Tobit models. The coefficients of the interaction terms remain significant in all cases but one.
Interestingly, the direct effect of stringency is not significant for all but one case using left censored
values.
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Table 1.7: Regression of R&D intensity on perceived environmental regulatory strin-
gency interacted with pollution intensity and immobility using different lag struc-
tures
One period lag Two period lag
Industry Share in GDP -0.0869*** -0.0926***
(0.0236) (0.0275)
Pollution Intensity*Stringencyt−1 -0.000764***
(0.000233)
Immobility*Stringencyt−1 0.125***
(0.0368)
Pollution Intensity*Stringencyt−2 -0.000702**
(0.000278)
Immobility*Stringencyt−2 0.115**
(0.0494)
Stringencyt−1 -1.086 0.502
(0.767) (0.461)
Stringencyt−2 -1.148
(0.802)
Constant 1.272 -0.927
(3.035) (5.074)
Country, industry, and time dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3,224 2,808
Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.170
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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capita is included to control for overall development. Private credit, measured as
deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a percentage of GDP, is
added to account for differences in domestic financial development across countries.
Total tertiary education enrollment, expressed as a percentage of the total five-year
age group following secondary school, is included to measure the type of human
capital that most directly influences R&D. The institutional measure is comprised
of two subcomponents: a measure of the strength and impartiality of the legal system
(law) and a measure of popular observance of the law (order). Both measures are
scaled from 1 to 3, with 1 indicating weak institutional quality and 3 indicating a
strong legal system and observance of the law.13 Data on GDP, tertiary education,
and financial development are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
2011. Institutional measures are obtained through the PRS Group’s International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
All coefficients remain significant and change only marginally in magnitude. Be-
cause most of the added country-level variables are not significant, it is likely that
these variables do not change significantly across the sample time period and are
adequately accounted for by ηj in the original regressions. Overall, the main results
are maintained, indicating a robust specification to this set of additional controls.
1.5.2 Measuring environmental policy
I now take a closer look at the WEF index as the proxy for environmental regulatory
stringency. As mentioned previously, the advantage of the WEF measure is that it
captures the effect of managers’ perceptions. It may be the case that perceived
stringency is actually much higher than the level of regulation that exists in reality.
In this sense, the WEF index may not measure whether or not environmental policy
constraints are actually binding. Since this variable measures the perception of
13A similar institutional measure that specifically relates to corruption yields nearly identical
results.
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managers, it may also be endogenous, as perceived stringency is likely to decrease
when industries develop new technologies that help reduce the cost of compliance
with environmental policies. For this reason I employ a composite index of country
level environmental performance as an alternative proxy for stringency. The Yale
University Environmental Performance Index (EPI) provides a ranking of countries
based on their relative distance from certain environmental policy objectives. The
EPI considers 22 separate performance indicators in ten categories that include an
assessment of policies related to environmental quality and human health as well
as ecosystem sustainability. Countries are ranked based on their “position within
a range established by the lowest performing country (0 on a 0-100 scale) and the
target (equivalent to 100)” (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 18).
Although this index does not measure environmental regulations directly, it may
provide an indirect assessment of policy implementation and enforcement. A country
that is highly ranked in regards to environmental performance is likely to have more
stringent environmental regulations that are enforced. One weakness of both the EPI
and WEF indices is that they measure relative regulatory stringency. For example,
if regulations are strengthened in one country but by a smaller amount than in
others, the perception of policy stringency could decrease. For this reason, I also
consider a more objective measure of environmental regulations, the amount of tax
revenue, reported in U.S. dollars, raised through environmentally related taxes per
capita which is available from the OECD. The idea is that a country that collects
more in environmental regulation related tax revenue per capita is likely to have
stronger environmental regulations. Both the EPI and tax revenue variables are
positively correlated with the perceived stringency measure from the WEF. Table
3.5 illustrates these correlations along with the correlations of the other time-varying
country level variables, while Table A1 provides summary statistics related to these
variables.
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Table 1.9: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
R&D Intensity 1.674 5.052 0 166.856 3760
Industry Share in GDP 2.565 2.843 0 24.062 4886
Stringency 5.332 0.843 3.5 6.8 5026
EPI 61.203 6.513 43.28 77.994 5118
Tax Revenue per Capita 597.204 538.453 -2.261 2579.797 5118
Log Real GDP per Capita 11.123 1.939 8.662 16.795 5118
Private Credit 97.695 51.372 14.672 272.796 5049
Law and Order 5.085 0.815 3 6 4758
Tertiary Education 58.338 17.578 9.805 101.804 4741
Summary statistics for all variables over all years (2000-2007) and countries
Table 1.10 presents three additional specifications. The first column provides
the specification that includes total pollution intensity and immobility interacted
with the perceived stringency measure used in the main analysis (the last column in
Table 2.1). The second column shows total pollution intensity and immobility but
uses the EPI index as the measure of environmental policy stringency. The third
column interacts the environmental tax revenue variable with pollution intensity
and with immobility.
The signs and significance of the coefficients are remarkably similar using these
different measures. Aside from differences in magnitudes, which is expected, the
perceived stringency index is comparable to these two alternative environmental
regulation measures, thus strengthening the conclusions regarding the impacts on
R&D intensity. These results not only highlight consistent findings in regards to
the interaction terms, but also illustrate that the direct effect of environmental
regulatory stringency is negative, whether the WEF stringency measure, EPI index,
or environmentally related tax revenue data is used.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that the innovative response to environmental regula-
tions is conditional on industry characteristics in a cross-country setting. I find that
more pollution intensive industries innovate less than less pollution intensive indus-
tries as environmental regulations increase in stringency. This may indicate that
dirtier industries relocate rather than innovate. Interestingly, the impact on R&D
intensity through the industry immobility channel is much larger than the pollution
intensity effect. Industries that are more immobile innovate more than relatively
more mobile industries as stricter environmental polices are implemented, indicat-
ing that environmental regulations may induce innovation through this channel. I
also provide evidence that environmental regulations have a negative direct effect
on R&D intensities. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a
broad link between papers that study pollution havens and those that investigate
induced innovation, while using a methodology that has not been previously applied
in this setting.
Specific policy implications may arise from these results. If the goal is to induce
innovation through environmental regulations it may be optimal to target those
industries that are unable or less likely to relocate. The important point illustrated
in this paper, though, is that immobile industries are not necessarily the most
pollution intensive. Consequently, current policies that focus only on pollution
output as a restrictive measure may not result in innovative activity.
There is room for additional work on this topic that may be useful in the devel-
opment of policies. As the sensitivity analysis indicates, these results are robust to
additional country level controls and other measures of environmental regulation.
Further research that adds a dynamic component to the industry characteristics, as
data becomes available, could resolve some of the ambiguity regarding the relation-
ship between industry characteristics, as it would more accurately reflect the timing
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of policy changes. Decomposing the interconnections between immobility, pollution
intensity, and environmental regulations also deserve a closer look in future research
and would be useful in the development of effective environmental policies.
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Chapter 2
Who innovates with whom and why? Evidence
from international collaboration in energy
patenting
2.1 Introduction
Renewable and alternative energy technologies have the potential to conserve energy
and reduce carbon emissions worldwide. However, progress towards the implemen-
tation of these technologies remains stagnant. At the same time, technologies that
utilize fossil fuels continue to dominate the energy generation sector. For example,
global usage of coal-fired power generation technologies grew 6% from 2010 to 2012,
faster than any non-fossil fuel generation technology (IEA, 2013b). This may be
attributed, in part, to substantial obstacles to the employment of renewable en-
ergy technologies. These barriers include high up-front capital costs, infrastructure
requirements, and knowledge limitations (IEA, 2013b). Investment in innovation
becomes an important factor in lowering these costs. Collaborative innovation be-
tween countries may aid in cost and knowledge sharing, while also promoting the
diffusion of renewable and alternative energy technologies.
This issue is particularly important for the developing world, where the con-
sequences of climate change are magnified due to deficiencies in renewable energy
technologies and rapid expected growth in energy demand. In fact, energy consump-
tion in non-OECD countries is expected to increase by 84% over the next 25 to 30
years, as access to electricity expands in less developed nations (Wolfram et al.,
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2012). Given that most of the world’s innovative activity is concentrated in a few
developed countries (Nagaoka et al., 2010; Eaton and Kortum, 1999), policies that
encourage the United States, Japan, and Germany, for example, to spearhead joint
research efforts with developing nations could help transfer the necessary knowledge
needed to produce energy efficient technologies. Collaboration may be especially
important, as recent evidence indicates that knowlege spreads quickly within social
networks, where mutual learning develops within research teams (Montobbio and
Sterzi, 2013; Hoekman et al., 2009). The purpose of this paper is i.) to exam-
ine which countries innovate together to develop renewable and alternative energy
technologies and ii.) to study the factors that may contribute, either positively or
negatively, to collaborations of renewable and alternative energy technologies at the
country level.
To measure collaboration, I examine counts of renewable energy and alterna-
tive energy patents that have multiple inventors that are located in more than one
country. I obtain these counts from the OECD Regional Patent database, which
contains patent applications filed with the European Patent Office (EPO) and filed
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) international phase. These patents
provide a convenient way to study the importance of distance, both technological
and physical, on the propensity to collaboratively innovate. Evidence in the broader
literature suggests that geographical constraints may localize knowledge spillovers
(Keller, 2004; Jaffe et al., 1993) with the transmission of tacit information often re-
quiring person-to-person interaction (Kim et al., 2006). Collaborative patents pro-
vide an empirical avenue to study knowledge diffusion because they contain detailed
information about the inventors’ countries of origin and thus provide an illustration
of teams of scientists within global networks (Marsan and Primi, 2012). The disag-
gregated nature of patent data also makes it possible to identify specific renewable
energy sectors, such as solar, wind, and hydro power. This is useful when calculat-
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ing how similar countries are in terms of the production of renewable energy and
alternative energy patents and how this similarity may affect collaboration.
My goal is to investigate the factors that affect collaboration, to shed light on
potential policies that may encourage international knowledge diffusion. The im-
portance of distance, which represents the costs of face-to-face communication, mo-
tivates the use of a gravity model, commonly employed in international trade and
finance. Using the number of collaborative renewable and alternative energy patents
as the dependent variable, I include GDP per capita and the total number of patents
to account for mass, in terms of economic wealth and innovative activity. I also ex-
amine the effects of trade, common languages, and colonial relationships on the
propensity to collaborate on renewable energy and alternative energy production
technologies. In addition to the aforementioned variables, this paper is the first to
consider the influence of energy prices and production, similarity in environmental
regulations, and government renewable energy research and development (R&D), in
a patent collaboration study that relates specifically to energy related technology.
This paper relates to three lines of literature. First, a subset of the technology
diffusion literature explores collaborative patenting. My analysis is most closely re-
lated to work by Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) and Picci (2010), who utilize gravity
models to study knowledge transfer using collaborative patent data for all technol-
ogy classifications. Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) find that technological proximity
and common language are important determinants of patent collaboration between
eleven emerging and seven advanced economies. They find that intellectual property
rights positively affect collaboration when joint research occurs within subsidiaries
of multinational firms. Picci (2010) also indicates that cultural characteristics such
as common languages positively affect patent collaboration, while physical distance
negatively impacts patent collaboration. Other work by Maggioni et al. (2007)
shows that the similarity of regional innovation structure, R&D expenditures, and
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spatial proximity significantly impact collaborative patenting in Europe in both a
gravity and spatial econometric framework. Hoekman et al. (2009) and Hoekman
et al. (2010) examine regional collaboration in Europe using similar gravity models,
highlighting the importance of physical distance and institutional factors. Ma and
Lee (2008) construct indices based on co-inventorship data from the U.S. Patent
Office. Their results illustrate a pattern of increasing patent collaboration for the
eight most inventive OECD nations from 1980-2005. On the other hand, Ma et al.
(2009), narrow their focus to patent collaborations between China and other high
innovation countries, illustrating that these types of research collaborations have
steadily increased over time. These studies, however, focus on general patenting
in all technology classes. I examine the specific case of renewable and alternative
energy patents using this literature to motivate the relevant econometric techniques
to study collaborative patenting.
Second, I build upon key ideas related to absorptive capacity that originate from
studies of R&D cooperation at the firm level. Miotti and Sachwald (2003), who em-
pirically investigate domestic and international R&D partnerships using survey data
from French manufacturing firms, find evidence that firms that are closest to the
technological frontier tend to engage in cooperative R&D partnerships more fre-
quently. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find that, for Belgian manufacturing firms,
incoming knowledge spillovers contribute positively to cooperation. They also find
that the permanent level of R&D, a measure of the overall level of R&D capability
of a firm, contributes positively to the importance of incoming spillovers. In other
words, those firms that already engage in R&D and have a substantial research
base are more likely to form partnerships because they can better absorb incoming
information. Taking a broader approach by examining collaborative efforts at the
country level, I study the varying absorptive capacities of nations as a necessary
complementary resource. In the empirical model, I include a measure of the to-
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tal number of patent applications in all technology types to account for absorptive
capacity at the country level.
Third, work that examines the innovation and diffusion of energy technologies
provides motivation for the inclusion of energy prices and production, environmen-
tal R&D, and environmental regulations as contributing factors to collaboration.
The concept, first proposed by Hicks (1963), that increases in relative factor prices
can induce cost-saving technological change is investigated in detail in the environ-
mental literature. Environmental regulations, either directly through command and
control polices, or indirectly through taxes that increase energy prices, make the
employment of pollution intensive technologies more expensive. Many studies find
a positive effect of energy prices and regulation on innovative activity (Popp et al.,
2010). Newell et al. (1999), for example, find that changes in energy prices and
consumer regulatory standards are responsible for significant amounts of innova-
tion in energy-using consumer durables. Using patents from 11 different alternative
and energy-efficient technologies, Popp (2002) finds that prices and other regulations
that may increase the costs of fossil fuels induce new research at a rapid pace. I take
this idea a step further by asking how this cost-saving mechanism, via higher energy
prices or environmental regulations, affect collaborations that may aid in the diffu-
sion of environmentally related technologies across, rather than within, countries.
The use of collaborative patents differentiates my study from Verdolini and Galeotti
(2011), who study international technology diffusion in energy-efficient technologies
through geographic and technological channels. They find that distance, whether
physical or technological, negatively impacts knowledge flows. While they use patent
citations to measure these spillovers, I focus on the importance of person-to-person
communication that collaborative patents capture, providing a contribution to the
energy patenting literature.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized by the following. I find
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that technological proximity, common languages, trade relationships, and similarity
in environmental regulations are important drivers of international collaboration in
renewable and alternative energy patenting. Absorptive capacity, measured by the
total number of patents in all technology classes in a given year for each country,
has a significant and positive effect on collaboration for both countries in an inno-
vating relationship. I find physical distance to be largely unimportant, suggesting
that advances in communication and travel reduce the costs of communication. My
results also suggest that higher energy prices may not have a significant impact
on collaborative patenting while larger government investment in renewable energy
R&D decreases the probability of collaboration. When examining collaboration be-
tween developed and developing countries, I find that higher production of natural
gas positively affects the probability of collaboration for developing countries, sug-
gesting that in the developing world, countries that have more natural gas resources
may be more concerned with the development of efficiency improving technologies
that are often utilized to complement renewable technology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I discuss the use
of patent data as an innovation indicator and describe the construction of the main
data set, drawn from the OECD Regional Patent Database. Section 3 illustrates the
methodology and predictions concerning the variables that may affect collaboration.
I present the regression results in section 4, followed by concluding remarks in section
5.
2.2 Data
In the following section I describe the main database used to investigate the factors
that influence the propensity to collaborate in renewable and alternative energy
technologies. I explain the advantages and disadvantages of using patent data at the
country level as a measure of innovation. I also explain how I extract patents specific
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to renewable and alternative energy from the OECD’s Regional Patent Database.
2.2.1 Patents and collaborative patents
Patents counts are a widely used measure of innovation output. Patent documents
include detailed information about the patent’s inventors as well as technology clas-
sification information that is necessary for observing environmental technologies
(Popp, 2005). This allows me to i.) select patents that are related to renewable
and alternative energy production and ii.) identify patents that are internationally
collaborative. Figure A1, located in the appendix, provides an example abstract
from a collaborative patent used in this study. The abstract contains the date of
publication, along with the date on which the initial application was filed, which is
known as the priority date. In addition to containing a description of the technology,
the abstract also contains an identifying code (IPC) which allows for the selection
of specific technologies.1 Most importantly, the abstract provides the names and
country affiliations of all applicants and inventors. Thus, I can use patent counts to
identify collaboration between inventors across countries on specific types of tech-
nology. By contrast, an alternative measure of innovation, R&D expenditures, are
an input measure for the innovation process, and are generally not available for
specific environmental technologies. Thus, patent counts are superior for this study.
In this paper, I study applications filed to the European Patent Office. Because
significant heterogeneity can exist in the value of inventions that are ultimately
patented, I select patents that are also filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT), which allows patent applicants to seek protection simultaneously in multiple
nations through a unified procedure in each country’s national patent office. Filing
1This patent application seeks protection for a technology related to solar energy. The identi-
fying IPC code indicates that it is a “device adapted for the conversion of radiation energy into
electrical energy” under the code “H01G 9/20” in Table A4. The patent application indicates that
one inventor is from China and the other two inventors are from Switzerland. Thus, it is counted
as one instance of collaboration for the China-Switzerland country pair in the priority year of 2003.
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under the Treaty allows for an alternative route to patenting at the EPO and can be
considered a filing process that identifies high value patents since its purpose is to
assist with international patent protection (Van Zeebroeck and Van Pottelsberghe,
2011). Other strategies that can help identify high value patents include selecting
patents that are highly cited, or using Triadic patents, which are families of related
technologies that have been patented simultaneously under three regimes: the US
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), and the
European Patent Office (EPO) (Nagaoka et al., 2010). The idea is that the most
valuable patents will be highly cited and that submitting applications in multiple
patent offices will serve as a robust quality screening. Directly using citations as
a patent value indicator may be less appropriate for this study because citations
are not compulsory under the EPO. However, in an empirical patent value study,
Van Zeebroeck and Van Pottelsberghe (2011) find that patents filed through the
PCT are associated with more patent citations, and are a significant predictor of
the likelihood of patents also being Triadic. In other words, using the PCT as an
indicator of high value patents is similar to strategies that involve other patent value
indicators.
I use a single patent office, the EPO, to avoid complications that could be caused
by comparing patents in different regimes. Differences in examination systems and
disclosure requirements may affect patent information that is available. For example
all patent applications in Europe are automatically disclosed and applicants must
request an examination to proceed with their application. By contrast, disclosure in
the United States, where all patents are examined automatically, was not introduced
until 1999 (Nagaoka et al., 2010). Thus, the use of patent applications to the EPO
provides a comprehensive and comparable innovation measure.
While patent data provide the most accurate view of international collaboration
that is available, the extent to which patents with inventors in different countries
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represent actual research collaboration is uncertain. Bergek and Bruzelius (2010)
investigate whether patents with multiple inventors in different nations reflect ac-
tual cross-country R&D collaborations within the Swiss-Swedish multinational firm
ABB. They find that less than half of ABB’s internationally collaborative patents
represent actual joint research across nations. Through interviews with Swedish in-
ventors, they find that some credited inventors only participate in support roles, such
as providing advice, or application writing services, rather than actual R&D activi-
ties. They also find that temporary relocation, or relocation after the R&D project
is complete may also falsely indicate international collaboration. Their analysis,
however, looks only at one firm in a specific case study with only 53 collaborative
patents. As Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) point out, inventor movement may still be
indicative of international knowledge flows. For example, Kim et al. (2006) study
inventor movement in the labor market for scientists and find that collaboration
with researchers who have experience in a foreign country can help facilitate access
to new technology. Thus, without additional information available on the extent of
collaboration, collaborative patents provide at least one measure, albeit imperfect,
of such collaboration.
2.2.2 OECD Regional Patent Database
In this study, I focus on energy related technologies to shed light on how collabora-
tive innovations may help mitigate the growing demand for energy in the developing
world. To accomplish this, I extract patents related to renewable and alternative en-
ergy production from the OECD Regional Patent Database, which contains patent
applications filed to the European Patent Office (EPO) and patent applications filed
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) from 1977 to 2011 for OECD coun-
tries, the EU 27 countries, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (OECD,
January 2013). The database also contains a detailed regional component that links
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the addresses of applicants and inventors to more than 5,500 regions. Although I do
not utilize this aspect of the database directly, regionalization of the data ensures
that detailed inventor information is available for each patent, making the Regional
Patent Database the most appropriate for this study. Information about the inven-
tors’ countries of origin for each patent is drawn from the abstract and is compiled
in the database, allowing me to easily identify patents that include inventors from
different countries and are thus likely to be collaborative across nations. In order
to alleviate concerns about long lag times that can exist between the date of appli-
cation and the date the patent is granted under the EPO regime, I use the priority
year, the year closest to the time of invention, to determine the time component of
the panel.
The OECD Regional Patent Database is available to researchers by request from
the OECD. Patents are extracted in three steps. First, inventor names and ad-
dresses are merged with the corresponding IPC codes and priority years. Second,
patents related to renewable and alternative energy technologies are extracted from
the database based on identifying IPC codes. Third, patents that have multiple
inventors in more than one country are extracted and are subsequently counted in
terms of bilateral pairs, at the country level for each year.2
I select patents based on International Patent Classification (IPC) codes. Devel-
oped by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), these codes provide
a hierarchical structure for attributing patents to different technological categories.
These categories include broad groups with subdivisions for more specific technol-
ogy types. IPC codes are indicated on each patent document and are subsequently
included in the OECD Regional Patent Database. To identify the appropriate en-
ergy patents, I use IPC codes from two distinct sources. The first selection of IPC
codes is related to renewable energy and are from Johnstone et al. (2010), who study
2The methodology used for patent extraction in steps 1 and 2 was developed during my time
as a research assistant for Itziar Lazkano. I am grateful for her guidance in data construction and
for bringing my attention to the importance of renewable and alternative energy technologies.
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the effect of environmental policies on renewable energy innovation. After review-
ing the literature related to renewable energy advancements, they determine a set
of key words that are used to identify relevant IPC codes. These codes and their
descriptions are included in Table A3 in the appendix. Though widely used in the
literature to identify renewable energy patents, these codes are not comprehensive.
I also include IPC codes from the World Intellectual Property Services (WIPO) IPC
Green Inventory, listed in table A4. The IPC codes listed in the IPC Green Inven-
tory have been compiled by the IPC Committee of Experts in concordance with the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to better
facilitate searches of environmentally related patents. Lazkano (2014) and Lazkano
et al. (2014) also utilize a subset of these codes to study the transition from fossil fuel
to renewable energy technologies. These codes provide the most complete source of
IPC codes related to alternative energy production that is available.3 Using both
sets of IPC codes, the broad technology classifications used in this paper to capture
both renewable energy and alternative energy include solar, geothermal, ocean and
hydro power, fuel cells, biomass and man made waste, biofuels, other production or
use of heat, and waste heat.
2.2.3 Summary statistics
In total, the full database contains 2,458,535 unique patent applications to the EPO
from 1977-2011 that contain inventor credentials, of which 83,674 are collaborative
and have been filed through the PCT. Of this subtotal, I extract 5,139 collabo-
rative energy patents. Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of renewable energy and
alternative energy collaborative patents from 1977 to 2011. The series exhibits three
distinct trends, a steady increase in collaborative patents from 1977 to 2000, followed
by declines in 2001, 2003, and 2008. The trends in 2001 and 2003 are consistent
3For more information seehttp://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/est/
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with the general trend of renewable and alternative energy patent applications to
the EPO. In the broader collaboration literature, Ma and Lee (2008) find a con-
sistently upward trend in general collaborative patenting. However, their sample
period ends in 2005. The sharp decline in 2008 is likely due to patent publishing
delays. Applications filed using the PCT, in particular, can have a lag time of up to
31 months between the priority date and date of publication (OECD, 2008). For this
reason, I exclude patents published after 2008. Because one of the main variables of
interest, the level of environmental regulations measured by tax revenue raised from
environmentally related taxes, intersects only partially over countries and time with
the OECD patent data, I exclude patents published between 1977 and 1993 in my
analysis. These sample restrictions are indicated by the vertical lines in Figure 2.1.
Given these constraints, I examine 4,265 total collaborative energy patents between
1994 and 2008.
Figure 2.1: Time series of collaborative energy patents
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The first objective of this paper is to examine which countries collaborate to
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develop renewable and alternative energy technologies. Table 2.1 illustrates the top
10 renewable and alternative energy collaborative country pairs in the sample. Given
that the leading innovative research economies are the United States, Germany, and
Japan, it is not surprising that a large number of collaborations occur between
these and other developed nations. The largest number of collaborations occurs
between the United States and the United Kingdom. Nagaoka et al. (2010) use
data up to 2005 and show that when considering total patenting, as opposed to just
environmental patenting, 12% of U.K. patents contained a foreign inventor, larger
than both the U.S. (8.3%) and Japan (1.5%). Thus, the importance of both the
U.S. and U.K. as collaborative partners is reflected in the larger literature. It is
important to note that patent applications do not indicate a leading or following
country. Thus, the country listed as country 1 or country 2 in Table 2.1 is arbitrary.
Table 2.1: Top 10 energy patenting collaborative partners
Country 1 Country 2 Total collaborations
United Kingdom United States 483
Germany United States 364
Canada United States 323
Japan United States 230
France United States 216
Netherlands United States 192
Switzerland Germany 143
Belgium United States 132
Germany Netherlands 114
Germany France 113
Germany United Kingdom 104
Sample period 1994-2008
Since the motivation for this study relates largely to the growing need for renew-
able energy technologies in the developing world, it is also relevant to look at collab-
orative patenting between developing and advanced nations. Table 2.2 presents the
top 10 collaborative pairs that consist of one developing and one advanced economy.
47
I use the classifications for developing and advanced countries from the the World
Bank. I consider high income countries to be advanced and low and middle income
countries to be developing.4 For this subsample, the highest number of collabora-
tive patents occurs between the U.S. and China, followed by the U.S. and India.
In general, the number of instances of collaboration between the developed and the
developing world is small for these types of technologies, and non existent for devel-
oping to developing country collaboration. In the following section I describe why
this may be the case, as I outline the empirical methodology to explain these trends.
Table 2.2: Top 10 energy patenting collaborative partners between advanced and
developing nations
Developing country Advanced country Total collaborations
China United States 59
India United States 23
China Germany 18
South Africa United States 13
India Germany 13
Brazil United States 10
China United Kingdom 9
China Japan 9
China Switzerland 8
China France 8
Sample period 1994-2008
2.2.4 Firm analysis: Applicants vs inventors
In this paper, I focus solely on inventors, who are the main researchers and scientists
involved in producing the patented technology. I do not count patents based on
their applicants, who hold the legal right to the patent and are often the firm
or organization that provides the resources to develop the technology. There are
two reasons for this. First, this study relates closely to the diffusion of knowledge
4For more information see http://data.worldbank.org/income-level/HIC and
http://data.worldbank.org/income-level/LMY.
48
through the collaboration of research teams. Recent evidence suggests that the
transmission of technology often requires person-to-person interaction, facilitated
by close proximity (Kim et al., 2006). For this reason, examining the location of
the inventors is more appropriate as physical distance represents the cost of face-to-
face communication. Second, patent co-ownership may not be an accurate measure
of technology collaboration. Multiple applicants, even if they reside in different
countries, may be consolidated into a single applicant on the patent application, or
a third party may be listed instead (Nagaoka et al., 2010). In this sense, patent
applicants only provide partial information about collaboration.
While inventor information is important for identifying collaborative patents,
the innovative response to changes in environmental regulations and energy prices
is ultimately a firm-level decision. For this reason, I examine the applicant names
to determine i.) if these patents represent innovation within multinational firms or
true inter-firm collaboration and ii.) the distribution of collaborative energy patents
across firms.
Of the 4,265 collaborative energy patents in the sample period, 1,089 (about
26%) have more than one applicant. Within this subsample, some are identifiable
as collaboration within multinational firms. One clear example is Swiss miltinational
pharmacutical company Novartis, noted as “NOVARTIS AG” in the database. This
company appears as a joint applicant with “NOVARTIS PHARMA GMBH” which
has an Austrian affiliation, and thus can be denoted easily as a subsidiary firm.
However, if the applicants’ names are significantly different, it may be impossible to
determine the firm relationship. As one possible measure to estimate the number
of collaborative patents that result from inter-firm collaboration, I remove multi-
applicant patents that have the same first word in the applicant name. Using this
identifying strategy, I find that 952 patents (22%) are representative of across-firm
collaboration. Patent applications with only one applicant may be representative of
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collaboration within multinational firms. While this may be the case, they may also
indicate inter-firm collaboration where only one firm name is listed on the patent
application. This analysis, albeit limited, suggests that energy patent collaboration
occurs both within multinational firms and between firms.
Table 2.3 illustrates the distribution of collaborative energy patents for the top
10 patenting firms. Because more than one firm may be listed on a patent applica-
tion, patent counts are given in fractional terms, with equal contribution assigned
to each applicant. In general, patenting is not largely concentrated in this sample.
These innovative firms, consisting of multinationals in the developed world, account
for roughly 14% of the total collaborative energy patents in the sample. It is also
interesting to note that there are only 50 patent applicants with developing country
affilations. These statistics may highlight the importance of multinational firms for
technology transfer, however, strong conclusions cannot be drawn due to difficulties
in firm name identification. Even if much of the collaboration occurs within multi-
nationals, exploring this collaboration across inventors in different countries may
still be useful.
Table 2.3: Top 10 patenting firms 1994-2008
Total collaborative
Firm Name Country energy patents (1994-2008)
SHELL INTERNATIONALE RESEARCH MAATSCHAPPIJ B V Netherlands 110.33
EXXONMOBIL RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING COMPANY United States 82.33
NOVOZYMES A/S Denmark 69.67
EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL PATENTS United States 62.00
BASF PLANT SCIENCE GMBH Germany 55.33
INCYTE GENOMICS United States 48.50
BASF SE Germany 44.50
FORSCHUNGSZENTRUM JULICH GMBH Germany 39.17
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION United States 39.02
GENENCOR INTERNATIONAL United States 37.33
Total 588.18
% of total collaborative energy patents 13.79
Patent counts are fractional because a patent application can have more than one
applicant.
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2.3 Methodology
In this section, I present an empirical model to explain knowledge flows, embodied
through counts of collaborative environmental patents, between inventors located
in separate countries. Specifically, I analyze the determinants of collaboration in
renewable and alternative energy patents using a gravity model. The gravity model
is a frequently used empirical tool, analogous to Newton’s gravity law, that indicates
that the gravitational force between two objects is dependent on the mass of the
objects and the distance between them (Picci, 2010). It is remarkably successful in
explaining bilateral trade flows, demonstrating that trade between two countries is
increasing in their respective economic sizes, and decreasing in their physical dis-
tance (Bacchetta et al., 2012). The gravity model is now widely employed in the
research collaboration literature. Montobbio and Sterzi (2013), Picci (2010), Mag-
gioni et al. (2007), Hoekman et al. (2009) and Hoekman et al. (2010) all utilize
this framework to study patent collaboration across broad patent categories. The
idea is that the propensity to collaborate should be influenced negatively by phys-
ical distance, which represents the costs of tacit knowledge transfer, as well as the
innovative size of each country.
I estimate the following gravity equation where the dependent variable, Pijt, is
the number of collaborative energy patents between countries i and j in year t:
E[Pijt] = exp[ai + aj + at + β0 + β1lnAit + β2lnAjt + β3lnDij + β4lnEijt + β5lnMijt
+β6Tijt + β7Rijt + β8Cijt + β9Xij + ηijt]
(2.1)
I identify collaborative patents as patents where at least one inventor resides in
a different nation. 90% of the patents in the sample have inventors from only two
countries. If a patent has inventors from more than two countries, each instance of
collaboration is counted uniquely. For example, if a single patent contains inventor
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names from China, Switzerland, and the United States, a count of 1 is assigned to
each country pair: China-Switzerland, China-United States, and Switzerland-United
States. An alternative method of quantifying collaboration, used by Picci (2010) in
a gravity model patent collaboration study, is to utilize fractional counting. This
involves assigning a count of 1
3
to each country in the previous example. I choose
the former method, to study the bilateral nature of knowledge transfer. Since the
majority of collaborations in my sample are between only two countries,“double-
counting” is less of a concern.
In this specification, A indicates a set of country specific factors, such as the total
number of patent applications in all technology classes in a given year and real GDP
per capita. These variables are included to control for the size of innovative activities
and economic wealth. As with the dependent variable, the number of collaborative
energy patent counts, total patent counts are also drawn from the OECD’s Regional
Patent Database and include all technological classifications. GDP per capita data
is from the Penn World Table.My prediction is that the probability of collaboration
in environmental technologies depends on the size, in terms of wealth and innovative
activity and thus I substitute these variables for the “mass” component of the gravity
formula.5 I expect that richer, more innovative countries, will be more likely to
collaborate, as these variables provide a measure of absorptive capacity. I base
this prediction on evidence in the larger literature that indicates that a firm or
country must have a certain level of technological skill in order to successfully absorb
foreign knowledge (Keller, 2004). For example, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), who
examine the effects of knowledge flows on R&D cooperation, find that firms that have
higher technological capabilities are more likely to collaborate on R&D projects.
Geographic proximity, measured by the distance between the most populated
cities in kilometers, is represented by D. I obtain this data from CEPPI’s GeoDist
5Montobbio and Sterzi (2013), for example, use labor force size as a “mass” variable in a patent
collaboration study of all technology classes. I include real GDP per capita as a “mass” measure
but not the level of real GDP because it is highly correlated with the total number of patents.
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Database.6 Keller (2004) emphasizes that distance is a significant factor in technol-
ogy diffusion. For example, if technology is transferred through trade in intermediate
goods (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), then one would expect technology diffusion to be
geographically localized due to empirical evidence that trade declines with distance
(Bergstrand, 1985). In this case, the idea that some knowledge, known as tacit
knowledge, is difficult to transmit via spoken or written communication may also be
important when considering distance. Literature in both economics and sociology
indicates that body language and active participation in the innovating activity,
that can only be achieved through person-to-person interaction, may be essential
for communicating knowledge (Kim et al., 2006; MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995).
Due to this “tacitness” of knowledge transfer, I expect distance to negatively affect
research collaboration.
A contribution of this paper is the inclusion of two additional variables of interest,
country-level energy prices and government spending on R&D related to renewable
energy which are included in E. Based on data availability for this particular time
period, I am able to include natural gas prices as a measure of country-level energy
prices. Natural gas is a major fuel source used in the production of electricity (IEA,
2013a). These prices are obtained from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA)
Energy Prices and Taxes Statistics and are quoted in U.S. dollars per unit.7 The
idea is that when the prices of these “dirty” inputs increase, countries will invest in
the development of technologies that use less of these inputs, leading to more col-
laboration to aid in the development of alternative energy sources. I lag these prices
by one period, as the effect of input prices is unlikely to be instantaneous. Thus,
I expect energy prices to positively impact collaboration. Data related to govern-
ment spending on renewable energy R&D comes from the IEA’s Energy Technology
RD&D Statistics. I expect this variable to negatively impact collaboration, as coun-
6See Mayer and Zignago (2011) for more information.
7Units of measurement for natural gas is MWh.
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tries that have domestic resources to invest in the development of renewable energy
sources are less likely to need international collaboration.
It is important to note that, in contrast to gravity models in the international
trade literature, the dependent variable is a non directed measure. In other words,
I cannot directly observe the direction in which knowledge flows. Collaborative
patents do not provide information regarding the contribution of each inventor. If
this were the case, countries i and j could be classified in terms of a main innovator
and innovating partner country, providing some insight on the direction of knowledge
transfer. To allow for interpretation, the variables included in E are constructed as
the sum of R&D expenditures and the sum of energy prices by countries i and j.
The extensive literature on trade as a mechanism of technology diffusion moti-
vates the inclusion of M , which represents the dollar value of country i’s imports
from country j, as in Montobbio and Sterzi (2013). Import data is drawn from the
OECD’s STAN Bilateral Trade Database.8
T is the technological similarity between countries i and j in year t. This value
is measured as the angular separation, or uncentered correlation coefficient, of each
country pair’s vectors of patents across 8 technology classifications at time t.9 Fol-
lowing Jaffe (1986) and Montobbio and Sterzi (2013), the formula for this similarity
measure is given by:
Tijt = PitP
′
jt/[(PitP
′
it)(PjtP
′
jt)]
1/2 (2.2)
Where Pit and Pjt are the two countries’ vectors of patents across all classifications.
The value of this coefficient ranges from zero to one, with one indicating identical
distributions of technological activities (perfectly similar) and zero indicating perfect
technological dissimilarity (no similarity). Countries that are more similar techno-
logically may be better able to form synergetic relationships. Thus it is expected to
8Considering the value of country j’s imports from country i provides similar results as the
assignment of countries to i and j is random. Analyzing the value of exports also does not
qualitatively change the results.
9This includes all categories of renewable and alternative energy used in this study.
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have a positive impact on collaboration.
My unique contribution to the use of the gravity model on collaborative patenting
involves the construction of a variable that measures the similarity of environmental
regulations between each country pair. This variable, R, is calculated from country-
level data on the percentage of tax revenue raised through environmentally related
taxes relative to GDP. This data is drawn from the OECD’s Database on Instruments
Used for Environmental Policy and Natural Resources Management. Although this
variable restricts the time dimension of the sample to 1994-2008, it includes data
from several developing countries included in my study, notably Brazil, China, Hun-
gary, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. I utilize a weighted form of the Manhattan
distance formula, called the Canberra similarity measure, to quantify the similarity
in regulations between two countries (Lance and Williams, 1966). The formula is
given by:
Rijt = |Taxit − Taxjt| / |Taxit + Taxjt| (2.3)
Where Taxit and Taxjt are the two countries’ total tax revenues raised through
environmentally related taxes relative to GDP for time t. The Canberra similarity
measure is more appropriate in this case because, unlike the angular separation
used to measure technological similarity, it does not require two or more vectors
for computation. The value of this variable also ranges from zero to one, with
one indicating perfect regulation similarity and zero indicating perfect regulation
dissimilarity. Countries that have similar regulatory environments are expected to
collaborate more due to institutional synergies.
I also include the total number of bilateral collaborations in all technology fields
between each country pair in a given year. This variable is constructed in the
same way as the dependent variable, as counts of patents whose inventors come
from different countries, denoted as C in Equation 2.1. I expect this variable to
have a positive impact on energy patent collaboration, as it indicates an established
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research relationship. It may also help control for any country-pair specific variables,
such as policy and trade agreements.
X is a set of time invariant dummy variables including indicators for common
language and past colonial relationships. These variables are taken from the CEPPI
database, and are often included in gravity model studies that relate to both trade
and technological collaboration. Countries that share a common language or have
ever had a colonial relationship may have reduced costs of communication. This
may contribute positively to both trade and collaboration relationships. The esti-
mating equation also includes a full set of country and time fixed effects (ai, aj, at).
Summary statistics for all variables across countries and over time are included in
Table A1 in the appendix.
2.3.1 Estimation strategy
While OLS is generally used to estimate log-linear gravity models, I employ an
alternative econometric technique to estimate equation 2.1. The Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is advantageous in this context for two rea-
sons. First, the dependent variable is a non-negative, integer count variable, for
which Poisson models are commonly employed (Cameron and Miller, 2013). Sec-
ond, there are many observations where collaborative environmental patenting does
not take place. In other words, the dependent variable contains a significant num-
ber of zero values, 92%, here. In a traditional bilateral trade model that contains
zero-trade flows, common approaches include dropping observations with zero trade,
since the logarithm of zero is undefined, or adding a small value (usually 1) to zero
values before taking logarithms (Bacchetta et al., 2012). The Poisson estimator is
useful because it naturally accomodates zero values (Shepherd, 2013). The PPML
estimator, in particular, is important in this study because it is generally consistent
even when the number of zeros in the sample is quite large (Santos Silva and Ten-
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reyro, 2011). When using PPML, the dependent variable is in levels rather than
logarithmic form, however, the independent variables in logarithmic form can still
be intepreted as elasticities (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Shepherd, 2013).
A zero inflated Poisson or negative binomial model could be used as an alterna-
tive specification. Zero inflated models assume that the dependent variable consists
of two groups. In the first group, the conventional Poisson or negative binomial
successfully models the process and the count can take on a positive value or a
value of zero. In the second group, it is impossible to have a value other than zero
and any variation in covariate values will not affect the outcome. A zero inflated
model includes a logistic regression to predict which group an observation belongs
to (Allison, 2012). This model is less appropriate in the case of patent collaboration
because it is difficult to envision a group of country pairs where collaboration is
entirely impossible. A standard panel negative binomial model, which corrects for
the overdispersion caused by the large percentage of zeros, yields nearly identical
results to the PPML estimates presented in the next section.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Full sample
Table 2.4 presents the baseline Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) esti-
mates. In each column, the dependent variable is the number of renewable and
alternative energy collaborative patents. All explanatory variables, with the excep-
tion of technological similarity, common language, and colonial relationship are in
natural logs. I include indicator variables for countries i and j to control for unob-
served factors that may affect collaboration, as well as a full set of time dummies. As
a benchmark parsimonious gravity model, column (1) considers only distance and
mass, captured by GDP per capita and the total number of patents. Distance, both
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technological and physical, have a significant impact on the propensity to collabora-
tively patent. As expected, physical distance has a negative impact, suggesting that
geographical constraints may present barriers to communication and tacit knowledge
transfer. Technological similarity is positive and highly significant. This indicates
that countries that are similar in terms of innovation across different energy sectors
are more likely to collaborate. The coefficients on total patents, for both countries
in the innovating pair, are positive and significant, illustrating the importance of
absorptive capacity in collaborative relationships. The coefficient on total collabo-
rations between country i and country j is also positive and statistically significant,
indicating a positive effect of current research collaboration in all technology fields.
GDP per capita does not have a significant effect.
Column (2) adds imports to the original specification. After controlling for trade,
the pure effect of distance disappears completely. This may indicate that this spec-
ification captures both the direct and indirect effect (through trade relationships)
of geography. Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) find that the coefficients of distance
and trade become insignificant once import value is included in their general patent
collaboration study. In my study, however, the coefficient of import value in spec-
ifications (2), (3) and (4) is positive and significant, illustrating that as the value
of imports by country i from country j increases, the higher is the probability of
research collaboration in energy technologies. The impact of trade is also quantita-
tively substantial, indicating that a 1% increase in imports is associated with a 49%
increase in collaborative energy patenting in column (3), holding all other variables
constant. Common language and colonial relationships are included separately in
columns (3) and (4) due to their small, but positive relationship (correlation coef-
ficient of 0.32). In line with both Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) and Picci (2010),
who look at general patenting, sharing a common language facilitates collabora-
tion as does having a past colonial relationship. Interestingly, the coefficient on the
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total collaborations between countries i and j is not significant in column (3). It
is likely that total collaborations incorporates the effect of common langauge as a
country-pair specific variable.
To explore the impact of environmental policy on the propensity to collaborate
on energy patents, I present specifications that include environmental regulations,
government R&D related to renewable energy, and energy prices in Table 2.5. Evi-
dence from both the empirical and theoretical IO literature on R&D collaboration
emphasize similarity as an important partner characteristic for forming compati-
ble relationships (Veugelers, 1998). Thus, I include the measure of environmental
regulation similarity in Column (1). The positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cient indicates that countries that have similar environmental regulations are more
likely to collaborate on environmental technologies. The magnitude of this esti-
mate is larger than the positive and significant impact of technological similarity.
This suggests that environmental regulation similarity may be an important factor
when it comes to research collaborations in energy technologies.10 As in the base-
line regression, common language has a positive and significant impact on energy
patent collaboration while total collaborations between countries i and j remain
insignificant.
Column (2) introduces the effect of government spending on R&D related to
renewable energy. The negative coefficient of government renewable energy R&D
suggests that the more countries i and j jointly spend on R&D, the less likely it is
that they will collaborate on energy patents. It may be the case that countries that
invest in renewable energy R&D are less likely to collaborate because they already
have greater access to resources, however, this effect appears to be smaller, with
an elasticity of 12%, than the other factors that positively impact collaboration.
10There may be some concern that collaboration with the United States may be fundamentally
different. For example, countries within the European Union are subject to similar environmental
policy and thus should be considered separately from the U.S. Removing the U.S. from the sample,
however, does not qualitatively change the results.
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Column (3) explores the role of energy prices. I include the sum of the lagged
prices of natural gas for countries i and j. This coefficient is negative but lacks any
explanatory power.11
2.4.2 Advanced and developing country matched sample
In order to explore the data in greater detail, I allow countries i and j to represent
advanced and developing nations respectively. To avoid confusion with the previous
analysis, I denote the advanced country as a and the developing country as d. This
allows me to study how collaboration could facilitate the transfer of renewable and
alternative energy technologies to the developing world. One advantage of this
specification is that the tax revenue from environmental regulations variable can
be included individually for each country in the innovating pair, rather than as the
similarity measure Rijt.
These specifications are presented in Table 2.6. Because energy price data for
developing countries is not available, I include data on the production per capita
of natural gas, measured in quadrillion btu per person, from the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration. Popp et al. (2011), argue that countries that have more
domestic resources are more likely to have lower energy prices and thus will be less
concerned with investment in renewable technologies. In this sample, no country
pairs have common languages or colonial relationships. Consequently, these indi-
cator variables are excluded. Similar reasoning is used to exclude the government
renewable energy R&D variable, as few developing countries make this type of in-
vestment.
These results highlight several important points. First, the coefficient of tech-
nological similarity is a positive and significant determinant of environmental col-
laboration between advanced and developing countries in all specifications. Second,
11Including world prices of natural gas and oil produces similar results. Excluding the R&D
variable and regulation similarity measure does not significantly impact the energy price coefficient.
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the coefficient on total patents for the advanced country is positive and significant
in Columns (1), (2), and (3), however the coefficient on total patents for the de-
veloping country is not. This may suggest that the technological capability of the
advanced country is the important factor for research collaboration on energy tech-
nology. Third, the coefficient on natural gas production per capita is positive and
statistically significant in Columns (3) and (4), but only for the developing country.
This means that higher production per capita of natural gas in developing coun-
tries increases the probability of collaboration on energy patents with advanced
economies. While a negative coefficient is expected for this variable, it may be the
case that as developing countries produce more natural gas, they demand greater ac-
cess to efficiency improving technologies. It may be difficult to distinguish between
renewable and alternative energy and efficiency improving natural gas technologies
from patent IPC codes alone. For example, Lanzi et al. (2011) identify energy tech-
nology patents that improve the efficiency of fossil fuels for electricity generation.
In particular, one IPC code that they select is “F02C,” which broadly represents
gas-turbine plants as a type of general fossil fuel technology. My sample includes
the IPC code “F02C 1/05,” a subcategory of the IPC code identified in Lanzi et al.
(2011), which identifies technologies related to gas turbine power plants using solar
heat sources. Natural gas turbines are often used in conjunction with solar and
wind technologies because they are intermittent sources of electricity that require
backup power to meet the needs of energy intensive societies (Dodge, 2013). U.S.
multinational GE recently developed a new energy efficient gas turbine that is ex-
pected to help integrate more renewable energy sources in the U.S., Europe, China,
Japan, and nations in the Middle East (Bullis, 2012). In other words, developing
countries who have more domestic natural gas resources may have a stronger inter-
est in developing technologies that utilize this input more efficiently for use with
renewable energy. Patents selected using the IPC codes in Tables A4 and A3 may
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illustrate this effect. It should be noted that this result is unique to natural gas,
as including oil production per capita does not have a significant impact on energy
collaboration. Thus, it is unlikely that the IPC codes used in this paper identify
only “dirty” technologies. This result may illustrate the importance of natural gas
for the employment of renewable energy technology.
Lastly, the coefficient on environmental tax revenue is positive and significant
for the advanced country in Column (4). This may suggest that concerns over
transboundary pollution may encourage countries that have strong environmental
regulations to begin collaborative research projects with those that have weak en-
vironmental regulations. Distance and imports do not appear to have a significant
impact on energy patent collaboration between advanced and developing countries.
2.5 Conclusion
Patent collaboration in energy technologies has the potential to reduce costs and
promote the diffusion of cleaner technologies. In this paper I examine where these
collaborations arise and why, to better understand the factors that may facilitate
the transfer of renewable and alternative energy technology. I construct a novel
country-level patent database and include energy prices and production, government
renewable R&D spending, and differences in environmental regulations. This work is
the first to explore the effect of these variables on collaboration in energy patenting.
The empirical results indicate that, in line with prior patent collaboration stud-
ies, technological similarity, trade relationships, innovative size, and common lan-
guages are positive predictors of collaboration in energy technologies. I find that
nations that have similar environmental regulations are more likely to participate
in patent collaboration, suggesting that institutional synergy may be an important
motivating factor. While most patent collaborations in renewable and alternative
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Table 2.4: PPML estimates for all country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Collaborative Collaborative Collaborative Collaborative
patents patents patents patents
Distance -0.320*** 0.120 0.119 0.0693
(0.0562) (0.100) (0.0888) (0.0842)
Technological similarity 1.291*** 1.107*** 1.141*** 1.073***
(0.374) (0.336) (0.339) (0.341)
Total patentsi 0.800*** 0.717*** 0.702*** 0.695***
(0.234) (0.232) (0.228) (0.227)
Total patentsj 0.592*** 0.430** 0.426** 0.370**
(0.184) (0.179) (0.181) (0.180)
GDP per capitai 0.440 0.461 0.457 0.418
(0.671) (0.650) (0.644) (0.646)
GDP per capitaj -0.522 -0.842 -0.892 -0.863
(0.924) (0.906) (0.923) (0.903)
Import value 0.561*** 0.489*** 0.548***
(0.0958) (0.0930) (0.0871)
Common language 0.351***
(0.112)
Colonial relationship 0.395***
(0.103)
Collaborationsij 0.103*** 0.0618** 0.0418 0.0578**
(0.0312) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0283)
Constant -7.236 -8.723 -7.745 -6.910
(12.47) (12.01) (12.11) (12.01)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countryi dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countryj dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,284 2,284 2,284 2,284
Log pseudo-likelihood -1497 -1459 -1452 -1450
Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: PPML estimates for all country pairs which include environmental ex-
planatory variables
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Collaborative Collaborative Collaborative
patents patents patents
Distance 0.0834 0.0771 0.0737
(0.0757) (0.0748) (0.0763)
Technological similarity 1.134*** 1.112*** 1.132***
(0.333) (0.325) (0.323)
Total patentsi 0.697*** 0.726*** 0.715***
(0.228) (0.226) (0.223)
Total patentsj 0.453** 0.598*** 0.608***
(0.184) (0.193) (0.194)
GDP per capitai 0.660 0.787 0.734
(0.650) (0.647) (0.650)
GDP per capitaj -1.059 -0.492 -0.441
(0.924) (0.922) (0.927)
Import value 0.581*** 0.580*** 0.571***
(0.0910) (0.0907) (0.0903)
Common language 0.247** 0.259** 0.258**
(0.112) (0.111) (0.111)
Collaborationsij 0.0423 0.0320 0.0388
(0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0273)
Environmental regulation similarity 1.461*** 1.567*** 1.533***
(0.419) (0.421) (0.421)
Government renewable R&D -0.118** -0.112**
(0.0568) (0.0562)
Lag natural gas price -0.130
(0.142)
Constant -8.424 -16.42 -15.88
(12.25) (12.34) (12.28)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Countryi dummy Yes Yes Yes
Countryj dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,284 2,284 2,284
Log pseudo-likelihood -1444 -1441 -1441
Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: PPML estimates for advanced and developing country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Collaborative Collaborative patents Collaborative Collaborative
patents patents patents patents
Distance -0.133 -0.00781 0.0962 0.104
(0.156) (0.261) (0.279) (0.270)
Technological similarity 1.501* 1.509* 1.581** 1.611**
(0.789) (0.793) (0.788) (0.793)
Total patentsa 0.920** 0.873** 0.986* 0.762
(0.429) (0.428) (0.504) (0.533)
Total patentsd 0.631 0.630 0.0827 0.0869
(0.720) (0.725) (0.756) (0.757)
GDP per capitaa -2.427 -2.426 -2.859 -2.222
(2.892) (2.957) (2.537) (2.260)
GDP per capitad -0.685 -0.788 -0.526 -0.518
(2.052) (2.057) (1.926) (1.947)
Import value 0.100 0.186 0.190
(0.146) (0.162) (0.155)
Collaborationsad 0.0855 0.0828 0.0794 0.0587
(0.206) (0.203) (0.203) (0.216)
Natural gas production per capitaa 0.239 0.101
(0.199) (0.222)
Natural gas production per capitad 1.232** 1.233**
(0.510) (0.541)
Environmental tax revenuea 0.0110**
(0.00554)
Environmental tax revenued 0.000115
(0.00216)
Constant 15.79 15.34 28.69 20.04
(30.59) (30.89) (27.31) (26.50)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countrya dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countryd dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,561
Log pseudo-likelihood -312.3 -312.2 -310.2 -308.8
Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in parentheses
a denotes the advanced economy and d denotes the developing country
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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energy technologies occur between developed nations, I find that, when looking only
at collaboration between advanced and developing countries, technological similarity
continues to play a strong role. Higher production of natural gas positively affects
the probability of collaboration for developing countries, illustrating the possibility
of greater demand for efficiency improving technologies. Stronger environmental
regulations in advanced nations may improve energy patent collaboration with the
developing world due to concerns over global pollution levels. I also find that physical
distance proves to be consistently unimportant. Due to the decline in communica-
tion and travel costs, this result is not unexpected. There is also some confirmation
of this finding in the larger literature. For example, in a patent citation study,
Griffith et al. (2007) find that geographic concentration of knowledge spillovers has
declined significantly over time. Thus, the gravity model for energy patent collabo-
ration hinges on innovative size and technological distance (similarity), rather than
on physical proximity.
The results of this paper have strong policy implications. The International
Energy Agency recommends the expansion of international collaboration on energy
R&D to reduce costs and improve the efficiency of energy R&D investments (IEA,
2013b). The results of this paper suggest that this goal may be accomplished through
domestic regulatory changes. Increasing the strength of environmental regulations
at home could spur joint research projects abroad, to help mitigate the effects of
transboundary pollution. Because technological similarity is especially important
for technology transfer to the developing world, policies that help build the tech-
nological infrastructure of these nations could establish a foundation for research
collaboration. Subsidies that reduce the dependency of these countries on fossil
fuels may also be effective.
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Chapter 3
International financial openness and industrial
R&D
3.1 Introduction
The importance of financing for research and development (R&D), as a channel by
which finance affects economic growth, has received recent attention in the liter-
ature (Hall and Helmers, 2010). Less work has been done on the significance of
international capital markets as a source of R&D financing. One exception is work
by Maskus et al. (2012) who indicate that among several measures of international
financial development, only FDI is a significant factor in financing R&D. The goal
of this paper is to further investigate this finding to provide a more comprehensive
understanding of the effect of international financing on industrial R&D intensities.
Specifically, we examine the impact of refined measures of international financial
development on R&D intensities in 22 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD coun-
tries for the period 1990-2003. We contribute by examining separately the effects
of external assets and liabilities using measures of portfolio equity, FDI equity, and
foreign debt. We provide additional contributions by considering the effects of fi-
nancial openness as measured by capital control indices, as well as the composition
and relative importance of financial intermediaries and markets across countries.
Our study relates to three broad lines of literature. First, our work relates to
studies that emphasize the importance of financing for innovation. Aghion et al.
(2004) and Hall and Helmers (2010) provide evidence that firms rely upon external
financing from banks and equity markets to fund R&D expenditures once internal
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funds have been exhausted. At the industry level, Maskus et al. (2012) find several
measures of domestic financial development to be significant determinants of R&D
when interacted with external dependence and asset tangibility. They find that only
one international channel, FDI, has a significant impact on R&D intensities. In this
paper, we further consider how access to international financing may influence R&D
intensities at the industry level. Second, we draw upon recent evidence that links
financial openness to economic growth. Ve´gh (2013) discusses the effectiveness of
capitol controls by considering their ability to limit capitol inflows and shift the
composition of flows towards long-term flows. Kose et al. (2009) provide a compre-
hensive overview of the influence of capitol controls on growth. They emphasize that
equity market liberalization can boost growth, however, the distinction between de
facto and de jure capital account openness measures can be very important. This
motivates the inclusion of de facto and de jure measures of financial openness as
determinants of industrial R&D, a channel that may improve economic growth.
Third, our work relates to literature on financial structure. Demirguc-Kunt et al.
(2011) find that financial markets become relatively more important than banks as
countries develop. We consider how the relative importance of stock markets and
banks may influence industrial R&D intensities.
Our results can be summarized by the following. We find that multiple capital
openness indices and financial structure measures are important determinants of
R&D intensity. Our results indicate that the significance of FDI as an international
financial development measure is driven primarily by external assets. Specifically,
industries with higher external financing needs in countries with greater FDI abroad
tend to have higher R&D intensities. This suggests that multinational firms are able
to access funds from affiliate firms abroad and use such funds as an important source
of financing R&D expenditures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the method-
68
ology while section 3 describes the data used. We present our empirical results in
section 4 and concluding remarks in section 5.
3.2 Methodology
We study the impact of international financial development on industrial R&D in-
tensities, conditional on two industry characteristics identified by Maskus et al.
(2012): dependence on external financing and asset tangibility. The basic idea is
that industries that are more dependent on external financing will innovate more in
countries that are more financially developed. International financial development
should be less important for industries that have more tangible assets because they
have greater access to credit due to higher levels of collateral. Maskus et al. (2012)
focus on a range of measures of domestic financial development and international
financial openness measures. They show that international financial openness as
measured by FDI assets and liabilities is an important determinant of R&D at the
industry level.
In this paper, we further explore the role of international financial openness in
two ways. First, we consider the detailed channels by which international financial
openness may affect R&D. Maskus et al. (2012) find FDI to be the only significant
measure of international financial development to affect industrial R&D intensities.
Their measure of FDI is given by the sum of external FDI assets and liabilities. We
consider whether external assets or liabilities drive this result within portfolio equity,
FDI equity, and foreign debt. We expect that external liabilities, which represent
international borrowing or capital inflows to drive these results. However, given
that multinationals may access funds from affiliates abroad, external assets may
also be an important factor. Second, we look at a range of alternative measures
of openness. These measures include indices that measure cross-border financial
restrictions and the degree of financial account openness. Generally, we expect that
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industries that are more dependent on external financing to innovate less in countries
that have more cross border financial restrictions. In other words, industries that
are dependent on external financing will have fewer opportunities to access funds
from abroad in countries with more capital restrictions. Similarly, we expect that
industries with more tangible assets to innovate relatively more in less financially
open countries as they are less likely to need international funds. In the last part of
our analysis, we look at various measures of domestic financial structure to determine
whether the relative importance of intermediary versus market financing can impact
R&D intensities across countries. As countries grow, they tend to have larger and
more active financial markets that rely more on equity relative to debt (Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Levine, 1996). We expect that better developed equity markets relative
to debt markets can be beneficial for R&D in industries that rely more on external
financing.
To test our hypotheses, we use the estimating equation from Maskus et al. (2012).
This approach, developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), includes interaction terms
to allow for the utilization of cross-country variation to examine within-country
differences across industries. The estimating equation is given by the following:
R&D intensityj,k,t =β0 + β1(external financial dependencek x financial opennessj,t)
+ β2(tangibilityk x financial opennessj,t) + β3(industry sharej,k,t)
+ β4(financial opennessj,t) + ηj + ηk + ηt + j,k,t
(3.1)
where j indicates countries, k denotes industries, and t represents time. The in-
dicators ηk, ηj, and ηt control for unobserved industry, country, and time-specific
effects. As in Maskus et al. (2012), we calculate R&D intensities as total industry
R&D expenditures relative to industry output, across countries and time. Industry
share in GDP is included to control for different industry patterns across countries.
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The direct effect of financial openness is included in the regression as it varies across
both countries and time. However, the direct effects of the industry characteristics
are captured within ηk and are not included as separate variables since they are cal-
culated using U.S. data and do not vary across countries or time. The two industry
characteristics, external financial dependence and tangibility, are each interacted
with measures of international financial openness. These two interaction terms are
our primary focus. We expect β1 to be positive and β2 to be negative.
3.3 Data
We utilize the database constructed by Maskus et al. (2012), which includes R&D
intensities for 22 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD countries from 1990-2003.
R&D intensity is calculated at the industry-level as R&D expenditures as a per-
centage of industry production in each country.1 Industry shares are calculated
as industry production divided by GDP using data from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators 2007.
The industry characteristics of interest include external financial dependence
and tangibility. The measure of external financial dependence is from Klapper et al.
(2006) and is defined as the industry-level median across firms of the ratio of cap-
ital expenditures less cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures.
This measure is calculated from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database for U.S.
companies from 1990-1999. Tangibility, from Braun (2005), is calculated as each
industry’s share of physical assets in total capital stock using U.S. data from the
Compustat database for the same time frame. These industry characteristics are
calculated using U.S. data and do not vary across countries or time. As Maskus
et al. (2012) indicate, these characteristics represent inherent technological differ-
ences across industries that can be used to create a ranking. Using U.S. data provides
1R&D intensity calculated as R&D expenditures relative to value added provides similar results.
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a sufficient proxy as differences in these characteristics are likely to be small across
countries. Table A6 provides a summary of the industry characteristics ranked by
average R&D intensity. We interact these industry characteristics with country level
measures of financial openness as described below.
We first show the benchmark regression on aggregate measures of international
financial openness from Maskus et al. (2012). The now standard measure of financial
openness is given by the sum of external assets and liabilities, relative to GDP,
analogous to trade openness as measured by the sum of exports and imports relative
to GDP. Maskus et al. (2012) show that it is the FDI component of this measure that
is significantly related to R&D intensity. Thus, we first show their basic results for
FDI, portfolio equity, and foreign debt measured by the sum of assets and liabilities
within these measures. We then consider the following refined measures of financial
openness from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) in order to pick up the direction of
capital flows: portfolio equity assets, portfolio equity liabilities, FDI equity assets,
FDI equity liabilities, portfolio debt assets, and portfolio debt liabilities.2 These
disaggregated international financial openness measures consider the effect of the
accumulated capital flows in a specific direction (i.e. inflows as captured by external
liabilities and outflows as captured by external assets). These measures can be seen
as de facto measures of international financial openness.
As an alternative measure of international financial openness, we include indices
that measure de jure restrictions on cross-border financial transactions from Chinn
and Ito (2008) and Schindler (2009). The index developed by Chinn and Ito (2008),
KAOPEN, measures a country’s degree of financial account openness. The indices
from Schindler (2009) are based on underlying binary responses where 0 indicates
unrestricted and 1 indicates restricted capital flows. The overall index is broken
down into both inflow and outflow restrictions, which we include in our analysis.
2Total assets, total liabilities, foreign debt assets, foreign debt liabilities, other investment assets
and other investment liabilities do not yield significant results.
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Both the Chinn and Ito (2008) and Schindler (2009) measures allow us to explore
the role of capital controls on R&D intensities.
To examine the effect of financial structure, we utilize data from the World
Bank’s Financial Development and Structure Dataset 2013. We consider three rel-
ative measures: stock market capitalization/private credit, stock market capitaliza-
tion/deposit money bank assets, and stock market value traded/private credit.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 De facto measures
Table 3.1 presents the original results from Maskus et al. (2012). As these results
show, FDI appears to be the only international financial development measure that
significantly impacts R&D intensities. Table 3.2 presents our baseline specification
using refined measures of portfolio equity, FDI equity, and portfolio debt. Each of
these measures, broken down by assets and liabilities, is interacted with external
financial dependence and tangibility. The results illustrate a positive and significant
coefficient on the interaction of external dependence and international financial de-
velopment (β1) for portfolio equity assets, FDI assets, and portfolio debt liabilities.
The coefficient of the interaction between tangibility and international financial de-
velopment (β2) is negative, but only significant for FDI assets.
The positive β1 coefficient suggests that the original FDI estimation, using the
sum of external FDI assets and liabilities, from Maskus et al. (2012) is driven by
FDI assets, rather than FDI liabilities. This implies that industries that need more
external financing in countries that conduct more FDI abroad may improve that
country’s industry level R&D. This may be due to the fact that multinational firms
are already significantly innovative or it may indicate that global corporations are
able to tap into funds from foreign affiliate firms. The negative β2 coefficient sug-
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Table 3.1: Regression of R&D intensity on international financial development inter-
acted with external financial dependence and tangibility from Maskus et al. (2012)
Total external assets and liabilities Portfolio equity FDI equity Foreign debt
Industry share in GDP -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.150*** -0.130***
(0.0232) (0.0241) (0.0223) (0.0214)
Total external assets and liabilities -0.000359
(0.000617)
External dependence*Total external assets and liabilities 0.00124*
(0.000729)
Tangibility*Total external assets and liabilities -0.000788
(0.00189)
Portfolio equity -0.000225
(0.00254)
External dependence*Portfolio equity 0.00369
(0.00301)
Tangibility*Portfolio equity -0.00300
(0.00867)
FDI equity -0.00235
(0.00462)
External dependence*FDI equity 0.0194***
(0.00521)
Tangibility*FDI equity -0.0191*
(0.0115)
Foreign debt -0.000871
(0.000803)
External dependence*Foreign debt 0.000582
(0.000926)
Tangibility*Foreign debt 0.00110
(0.00224)
Constant 1.739*** 1.684*** 1.995*** 1.583***
(0.348) (0.352) (0.343) (0.332)
Country-, industry- and year-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Adjusted R-squared 0.464 0.463 0.469 0.463
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
gests that industries with less tangible assets benefit from being in a country with
greater FDI abroad. Finally, the positive and significant β1 coefficient on portfolio
debt liabilities interacted with external financing indicates the importance of foreign
borrowing (capital inflows). This may imply that the ability to borrow abroad is
loosening credit constraints for firms in these industries. It is interesting that the
tangibility measure interacted with debt liabilities is not significant such that indus-
tries with more tangible assets neither benefit from nor are hurt by greater access
to debt liabilities.
We employ a similar thought experiment that is used in Maskus et al. (2012) and
Rajan and Zingales (1998) to provide insight on the economic significance of these
coefficients. We consider how much the R&D intensity of the industry at the 75th
percentile of external financial dependence (furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.) exceeds
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Table 3.2: Regression of R&D intensity on disaggregated measures of international
financial openness interacted with external financial dependence and tangibility
Portfolio Equity Portfolio Equity FDI Equity FDI Equity Portfolio Debt Portfolio Debt
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Industry share in GDP -0.147*** -0.132*** -0.140*** -0.133*** -0.115*** -0.133***
(0.0251) (0.0224) (0.0198) (0.0227) (0.0240) (0.0234)
Portfolio equity assets 0.00217
(0.00820)
External dependence*Portfolio equity assets 0.0162*
(0.00895)
Tangibility**Portfolio equity assets -0.0259
(0.0249)
Portfolio equity liabilities -0.00179
(0.00313)
External dependence*Portfolio equity liabilities 0.00352
(0.00395)
Tangibility**Portfolio equity liabilities 0.00259
(0.0109)
FDI assets -0.000612
(0.0118)
External dependence*FDI equity assets 0.0493***
(0.0117)
Tangibility*FDI equity assets -0.0595**
(0.0279)
FDI equity liabilities -0.00254
(0.00727)
External dependence*FDI equity liabilities 0.00470
(0.00759)
Tangibility*FDI equity liabilities -0.00348
(0.0190)
Portfolio debt assets -0.00546
(0.00378)
External dependence*Portfolio debt assets -0.000658
(0.00319)
Tangibility*Portfolio debt assets 0.00935
(0.00788)
Portfolio debt liabilities -0.0200*
(0.0119)
External dependence*Portfolio debt liabilities 0.0282***
(0.0107)
Tangibility*Portfolio debt liabilities 0.00169
(0.0212)
Constant 1.814*** 1.603*** 1.878*** 1.674*** 1.135*** 1.709***
(0.363) (0.337) (0.322) (0.338) (0.358) (0.386)
Country-, industry- and year-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,468 3,468
Adjusted R-squared 0.464 0.463 0.472 0.463 0.460 0.462
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the R&D intensity of the industry at the 25th percentile of external financial depen-
dence (pulp, paper and paper products) if both were moved from a less financially
open country (25th percentile), to a more financial open country (75th percentile),
while holding tangibility at its mean. We apply the same thought experiment to
the tangibility measure by considering an industry at the 75th percentile of tangi-
bility (Rubber and plastics products) with one at the 25th percentile of tangibility
(chemicals and chemical products).
Table 3.3 summarizes the magnitude of the estimates that are significant in Ta-
ble 3.2 by indicating the implied percentage-point change in R&D intensity relative
to the average industry R&D intensity across countries and time. FDI equity as-
sets have the largest impact, 26.7% of the average R&D intensity, based on the
interaction with external dependence. This effect is larger than the 19.7% reported
by Maskus et al. (2012) who conduct a similar thought experiment for total FDI.
Though not as large, we find that external dependence interacted with portfolio debt
liabilities and portfolio equity assets provide increases in R&D itensity of 16.3% and
5.78% of the mean R&D intensity respectively. The interaction with tangibility is
only significant for FDI equity assets, however, the impact of -29.4% is again larger
than the findings for total FDI (-17.4%) in Maskus et al. (2012).
3.4.2 De jure measures
In addition to the refined de facto measures of financial globalization in our baseline
results, we also consider de jure restrictions on cross-border financial transactions.
We interact the KAOPEN index from Chinn and Ito (2008) and Schindler (2009)’s
financial restriction indices (for inflow, outflow, and overall restrictions) with both
external dependence and tangibility in Table 3.4.
In the regression that includes the Chinn and Ito (2008) measure, KAOPEN,
we observe a positive coefficient for the financial dependence interaction term and a
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Table 3.3: Magnitudes of estimates
Differential in R&D intensity FDI Equity Assets Portfolio Debt Liabilities Portfolio Equity Assets
External dependence 0.59 0.36 0.13
as percentage of R&D intensity 26.7 16.3 5.78
Tangibility -0.65 - -
as percentage of R&D intensity -29.4 - -
Note: The first line reports the difference in percentage points between an industry
at the 75th percentile of external dependence in a country at the 75th percentile
of the respective financial development and an industry at the 25th percentile of
external dependence in a country at the 25th percentile of financial development.
The second line relates the percentage point difference to the mean R&D intensity.
The last two lines show magnitudes for the same thought experiment undertaken
for asset tangibility.
negative coefficient on the tangibility interaction term. This index takes on higher
values the more open the country is to cross border capital transactions. Thus,
industries that are more dependent on external financing innovate more in countries
that are more open to cross border capital transactions. Similarly, industries that
have more tangible assets innovate less in countries that are more financially open
because they are less likely to need funds from abroad.
The Schindler (2009) indices range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating restricted cap-
ital flows. Thus, we expect β1 to be negative and β2 to be positive. We anticipate
differences between inflow and outflow restrictions, with inflow restrictions expected
to be more detrimental to R&D. The coefficients on the external dependence inter-
action terms, β1, are negative and statistically significant across all Schindler (2009)
indices. Other indices that consider equity and bond inflow and outflow restrictions
from the Schindler (2009) dataset yield similar results, again with similar coeffi-
cients on restrictions of inflows and outflows. This indicates that industries who
are more dependent on external financing innovate less in countries that have more
restrictions. The coefficients on the tangibility interactions, β2, are positive and
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statistically significant. Industries that have more tangible assets innovate more in
countries that have more capital restrictions. There does not seem to be a signif-
icant difference between inflow and outflow restrictions, with surprisingly similar
coefficients and significance levels. Further analysis in Table 3.5 indicates that the
Schindler (2009) overall, inflow, and outflow restriction indices are highly correlated.
Overall, our findings indicate that openness indices are important determinants of
R&D intensity. More open countries tend to have higher R&D because industries
that need external financing or have fewer tangible assets may be able to tap into
international financial markets.
3.5 Financial structure
In this section we consider the structure of a country’s domestic financial system.
To measure the relative importance of equity markets to financial intermediation,
we interact the following ratios with our two industry characteristics: stock market
capitalization/private credit, stock market capitalization/deposit money bank as-
sets, and stock market value traded/private credit. Table 3.6 illustrates the results.
The coefficient on the interaction between external dependence and each financial
structure measure is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that more
developed equity markets, relative to financial intermediation, are associated with
larger R&D investments in industries that are more dependent on external financing.
The coefficient of the interaction between tangibility and each financial structure
measure is not statistically significant, indicating that industries with more tangible
assets neither benefit from nor are hurt by relative financial structure.
While these results suggest that equity markets may be important for R&D,
growth in per capita income may also be a significant factor. Given that economic
growth is associated with larger and more active financial markets, we attempt
to disentangle this possible income effect by including log real GDP per capita
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Table 3.5: Cross-correlation table for de jure measures
Variables KAOPEN Overall restrictions index Overall inflow restrictions index Overall outflow restrictions index
KAOPEN 1.000
Overall restrictions index -0.820 1.000
Overall inflow restrictions index -0.737 0.936 1.000
Overall outflow restrictions index -0.814 0.948 0.776 1.000
interacted with external financial dependence and tangibility. Table 3.7 provides
these results. The sign and significance of the coefficients of interest remain largely
unchanged. At the same time, the interaction between real GDP per capita and
tangibility is positive and significant. This implies that industries that have more
tangible assets have higher R&D intensities in richer countries.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the impact of financial openness on R&D intensities in
22 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD countries for the period 1990-2003. We
find an economically significant impact of FDI assets, rather than liabilities, on
R&D intensities when interacted with industry external financial dependence and
asset tangibility. We also find that several capital openness indices and financial
structure measures have significant impacts on R&D intensity. Interestingly, the
direction of capital flows are important for de facto measures, but when considering
de jure openness indices the direction of restriction does not appear to change our
results. In summary, we find that, for industries that are more dependent on external
financing and that have less tangible assets, international financial openness can be
a key factor in innovation investment.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics for full sample
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Collaborative energy patents 0.950 3.37 0 44 2284
Distance 7.906 1.221 4.088 9.883 2284
Import value 6.975 2.057 -3.324 12.238 2284
Technological similarity 0.67 0.328 0 1 2284
Total patentsi 6.451 1.544 1.07 9.392 2284
Total patentsj 5.924 2.331 0.288 10.225 2284
GDP per capitai 10.232 0.322 9.017 11.048 2284
GDP per capitaj 10.08 0.49 8.984 11.048 2284
Collaborationsij 0.164 0.573 0 713 2284
Common language 0.096 0.295 0 1 2284
Colonial relationship 0.044 0.206 0 1 2284
Environmental regulation similarity 0.192 0.144 0 0.712 2284
Government renewable R&D 4.418 2.638 -5.809 11.613 2284
Lag natural gas price 3.4 0.58 1.911 4.847 2284
Table A2: Summary statistics for matched advanced and developing country sample
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Collaborative energy patents 0.119 0.604 0 11 1561
Distance 8.545 1.029 5.069 9.856 1561
Import value 6.428 2.072 -0.6 11.93 1561
Technological similarity 0.593 0.37 0 1 1561
Total patentsa 6.19 2.158 0 10.225 1561
Total patentsd 4.318 1.276 0.288 7.673 1561
GDP per capitaa 10.156 0.418 8.939 11.013 1561
GDP per capitad 9.029 0.487 7.671 9.734 1561
Collaborationsad 0.028 0.133 0 245 1561
Natural gas production gas per capitaa -4.798 2.421 -12.067 -0.247 1561
Natural gas production gas per capitad -6.082 1.533 -9.093 -4.088 1561
Environmental tax revenuea 241.575 90.512 0 520.987 1561
Environmental tax revenued 213.379 150.239 -156.868 542.820 1561
a denotes the advanced economy and d denotes the developing country
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Table A3: Renewable Energy IPC codes from Johnstone et al. (2010)
Description IPC code (s) 
Wind 
   Wind motors with rotation axis substantially in wind direction 
   Wind motors with rotation axis substantially at right angle to wind direction 
   Other wind motors  
   Controlling wind motors 
   Adaptations of wind motors for special use 
   Details, component parts, or accessories not provided for in, or of interest apart 
   from, the other groups of this subclass 
 
F03D 1 
F03D 3 
F03D 5 
F03D 7 
F03D 9 
F03D 11 
 
Solar 
   Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy 
   Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors 
   Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor components sensitive to infra- 
   red radiation, light— specially adapted for the conversion of the energy of such 
   radiation into electrical energy 
   Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation, light—adapted as 
   conversion devices 
   Generators in which light radiation is directly converted into electrical energy 
   Aspects of roofing for energy collecting devices—e.g. incl. solar panels 
 
F03G 6 
F24J 2 
H01L 27/142 
 
 
H01L 31/04-078 
 
H02N 6 
E04D 13/18 
Geothermal 
   Production or use of heat, not derived from combustion—using natural or 
   geothermal heat 
   Devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy 
   Mechanical-power-producing mechanisms—using pressure differences or 
   thermal differences occurring in nature 
 
F24J 3 
 
F03G 4 
F03G 7/04 
Ocean 
   Tide or wave power plants 
   Submerged units incorporating electric generators or motors characterized by 
   using wave or tide energy 
   Mechanical-power producing mechanisms—ocean thermal energy conversion 
 
E02B 9/08 
F03B 13/10-26 
 
F03G 7/05 
Biomass and waste 
   Solid fuels essentially based on materials of non-mineral origin—animal or 
   vegetable substances; sewage, town, or house refuse; industrial residues or waste 
   materials 
   Engines or plants operating on gaseous fuel generated from solid fuel, e.g. wood 
   Liquid carbonaceous fuels; Gaseous fuels; Solid fuels 
 
   Dumping solid waste; 
   Destroying solid waste or transforming solid waste into something useful or 
   harmless; 
   Incineration of waste; Incinerator constructions; 
   Incinerators or other apparatus specially adapted for consuming specific waste or 
   low grade fuels, e.g. chemicals 
   Plants or engines characterized by use of industrial or other waste gases 
   Profiting from waste heat of combustion engines; 
   Machines, plant, or systems, using particular sources of energy—using waste 
   heat, e.g. from internal-combustion engines; 
   Incineration of waste; incinerator constructions; 
   Incinerators or other apparatus specially adapted for consuming specific waste or 
   low grade fuels, e.g. chemicals 
   Plants or engines characterized by use of industrial or other waste gases 
   Incineration of waste—recuperation of heat 
 
C10L 5/40-48 
 
 
F02B 43/08 
C10L 1 
C10L 3 
C10L 5 
B09B1 
 
B09B 
F23G5 
 
F23G 7 
F01K 27 
F02G 5 
F25B 27/02 
F23G 5 
F23G 7 
 
F01K 25/14 
F23G 5/46 
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Table A4: Alternative Energy IPC codes from the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) IPC Green Inventory
Description IPC code (s) 
Bio-fuels 
   Solid fuels 
   Torrefaction of biomass 
 
   Liquid fuels 
   Vegetable oils 
   Biodiesel 
 
 
 
 
   Bioethanol 
 
 
 
   Biogas 
 
 
 
   From genetically engineer organisms 
 
   Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) 
 
C10L 5/00, 5/40-5/48 
C10B 53/02 
C10L 5/40, 9/00 
C10L 1/00, 1/02, 1/14 
C10L 1/02, 1/19 
C07C 67/00, 69/00 
C10G 
C10L 1/02, 1/19 
C11C 3/10 
C12P 7/64 
C10L 1/02, 1/182 
C12N 9/24 
C12P 7/06-7/14 
 
C02F 3/28, 11/04 
C10L 3/00 
C12M 1/107 
C12P 5/02 
C12N 1/13, 1/15, 1/21, 5/10, 15/00 
A01H 
C10L 3/00 
F02C 3/28 
Fuel cells 
   Electrodes 
   Inert electrodes with catalytic activity 
   Non-active parts 
   Within hybrid cells 
    
H01M 4/86-4/98, 8/00-8/24, 12/00-12/08 
H01M 4/86-4/98 
H01M 4/86-4/98 
H01M 2/00-2/04 , 8/00-8/24 
H01M 12/00-12/08 
Pyrolysis or gasification of biomass C10B 53/00 
C10J 
Harnessing energy from manmade waste 
   Agricultural waste 
   Fuel from animal waste and crop residues 
   Incinerators for field, garden or wood waste 
   Gasification 
 
 
   Chemical waste 
  
   Industrial waste 
 
   Using top gas in blast furnaces to power pig- 
   iron production        
   Pulp liquors 
   Anaerobic digestion of industrial waste 
   
   Industrial wood waste 
   Hospital waste 
 
   Landfill gas 
   Separation of components 
 
   Municipal waste 
 
C10L 5/00 
C10L 5/42, 5/44 
F23G 7/00, 7/10 
C10J 3/02, 3/46 
F23B 90/00 
F23G 5/027 
B09B 3/00 
F23G 7/00 
C10L 5/48 
F23G 5/00, 7/00 
C21B 5/06 
 
D21C 11/00 
A62D 3/02 
C02F 11/04, 11/14 
F23G 7/00, 7/10 
B09B 3/00 
F23G 5/00 
B09B 
B01D 53/02, 53/04, 53/047, 53/14, 53/22, 53/24 
C10L 5/46 
F23G 5/00  
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Description IPC code (s) 
Wind energy 
   Structural association of electric generator  
   with mechanical driving motor 
   Structural aspects of wind turbines 
 
 
   Propulsion of vehicles using wind power 
   Electric propulsion of vehicles using wind  
   Power 
   Propulsion of marine vessels by wind-  
   powered motors 
F03D 
H02K 7/18 
 
B63B 35/00 
E04H 12/00 
F03D 11/04 
B60K 16/00 
B60L 8/00 
 
B63H 13/00 
Solar energy 
   Photovoltaics (PV) 
   Devices adapted for the conversion of 
   radiation energy into electrical energy 
 
   Using organic materials as the active part 
   Assemblies of a plurality of solar cells 
   Silicon; single-crystal growth 
 
 
   Regulating to the maximum power available 
   from solar cells 
   Electric lighting devices with, or 
   rechargeable with, solar cells 
   Charging batteries 
   Dye-sensitised solar cells (DSSC) 
 
   Use of solar heat 
   For domestic hot water systems 
   For space heating 
   For swimming pools 
   Solar updraft towers 
   
   For treatment of water, waste water or sludge 
   Gas turbine power plants using solar heat  
   source 
   Hybrid solar thermal-PV systems 
   Propulsion of vehicles using solar power 
   Electric propulsion of vehicles using solar  
   power 
   Producing mechanical power from solar  
   energy 
   Roof covering aspects of energy collecting 
   devices 
   Steam generation using solar heat 
 
   Refrigeration or heat pump systems using 
   solar energy  
   Use of solar energy for drying materials or  
   objects 
   Solar concentrators 
 
 
     Solar ponds 
 
 
H01L 27/142, 31/00-31/078 
H01G 9/20 
H02N 6/00 
H01L 27/30, 51/42-51/48 
H01L 25/00, 25/03, 25/16, 25/18, 31/042 
C01B 33/02 
C23C 14/14, 16/24 
C30B 29/06 
G05F 1/67 
 
F21L 4/00 
F21S 9/03 
H02J 7/35 
H01G 9/20 
H01M 14/00 
F24J 2/00-2/54 
F24D 17/00 
F24D 3/00, 5/00, 11/00, 19/00 
F24J 2/42 
F03D 1/04, 9/00, 11/04 
F03G 6/00 
C02F 1/14 
F02C 1/05 
 
H01L 31/058 
B60K 16/00 
B60L 8/00 
 
F03G 6/00-6/06 
 
E04D 13/00, 13/18 
 
F22B 1/00 
F24J 1/00 
F25B 27/00 
 
F26B 3/00, 3/28 
 
F24J 2/06 
G02B 7/183 
 
F24J 2/04 
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Description IPC code (s) 
Hydro energy 
  Water-power plants 
   Tide or wave power plants 
   Machines or engines for liquids 
 
   Using wave or tide energy 
   Regulating, controlling or safety means of    
   machines or engines 
   Propulsion of marine vessels using energy  
   derived from water movement 
 
   
 
E02B 9/00-9/06 
E02B 9/08 
F03B 
F03C 
F03B 13/12-13/26 
F03B 15/00-15/22 
 
B63H 19/02, 19/04 
Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) F03G 7/05 
Using waste heat 
   To produce mechanical energy 
   Of combustion engines 
 
 
 
   Of steam engine plants 
   Of gas-turbine plants 
   As source of energy for refrigeration plants 
   For treatment of water, waste water or 
   sewage 
   Recovery of waste heat in paper production 
   For steam generation by exploitation of the 
   heat content of hot heat carriers 
   Recuperation of heat energy from waste 
   incineration 
   Energy recovery in air conditioning 
   Arrangements for using waste heat from 
   furnaces, kilns, ovens or retorts 
 
   Regenerative heat-exchange apparatus 
   Of gasification plants  
 
 
F01K 27/00 
F01K 23/06-23/10 
F01N 5/00 
F02G 5/00-5/04 
F25B 27/02 
F01K 17/00, 23/04 
F02C 6/18 
F25B 27/02 
C02F 1/16 
 
D21F 5/20 
F22B 1/02 
 
F23G 5/46 
 
F24F 12/00 
F27D 17/00 
 
 
F28D 17/00-20/00 
C10J 3/86 
Devices for producing mechanical power from muscle 
energy 
F03G 5/00-5/08 
Other production or use of heat, not derived from 
combustion, e.g. natural heat 
   Heat pumps in central heating systems using heat 
   accumulated in storage masses 
   Heat pumps in other domestic- or space-heating 
   systems 
   Heat pumps in domestic hot-water supply systems 
   Air or water heaters using heat pumps 
   Heat pumps 
 
 
F24J 1/00, 3/00, 3/06 
 
F24D 11/02 
 
F24D 15/04 
 
F24D 17/02 
F24H 4/00 
F25B 30/00 
Geothermal energy 
   Use of geothermal heat 
 
 
 
 
   Production of mechanical power from 
   geothermal energy 
 
F01K 
F24F 5/00 
F24J 3/08 
H02N 10/00 
F25B 30/06 
F03G 4/00-4/06, 7/04 
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Table A5: List of countries
Advanced countries Developing countries
Australia AU Brazil BR
Austria AT Bulgaria BG*
Belgium BE* China CN
Canada CA Hungary HU
Chile CL India IN*
Czech Republic CZ Mexico MX
Denmark DK Romania RO*
Estonia EE South Africa ZA
Finland FI Turkey TR
France FR
Germany DE
Ireland IE
Israel IL
Italy IT
Japan JP
Korea KR
Luxembourg LU
Netherlands NL
New Zealand NZ
Norway NO
Poland PL
Portugal PT
Slovak Republic SK
Slovenia SI
Spain ES
Sweden SE
Switzerland CH
United Kingdom GB
United States US
*Excluded from estimations due to missing data, but included in the OECD Regional
Patent Database.
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Figure A1: Example collaborative patent abstract
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Table A6: Industry characteristics ranked by average R&D intensity
Industry name ISIC External dependence Tangibility Average R&D Intensity
Radio, television and communication equipment 32 0.328 0.159 0.090
Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 0.502 0.113 0.066
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 0.643 0.145 0.050
Other transport equipment 35 0.124 0.242 0.042
Chemicals and chemical products 24 0.791 0.178 0.040
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 31 0.137 0.209 0.029
Motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 34 0.394 0.273 0.024
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 29 0.076 0.209 0.019
Rubber and plastics products 25 0.300 0.364 0.014
Basic metals 27 0.147 0.410 0.007
Other nonmetallic mineral products 26 -0.121 0.389 0.006
Tobacco products 16 0.944 0.188 0.006
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 36 0.376 0.184 0.005
Textiles 17 0.262 0.343 0.005
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 28 0.166 0.276 0.005
Pulp, paper and paper products 21 0.123 0.504 0.005
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 -0.044 0.611 0.005
Leather, leather products and footwear 19 0.098 0.123 0.004
Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 18 0.174 0.126 0.003
Food products and beverages 15 0.181 0.347 0.002
Wood and products of wood and cork 20 0.156 0.447 0.002
Printing and publishing 22 0.096 0.214 0.001
Mean 0.266 0.275 0.020
Min -0.121 0.113 0.001
Max 0.944 0.611 0.090
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